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PROPERTY RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS IN WISCONSIN*
William W. Boyer, Jr.**
Separation of Church and State in the United States, and hence in
Wisconsin, does not mean that the Church must remain completely
isolated from the State or vice versa. Freedom of religion and worship
in most states requires that each group of worshippers has the oppor-
tunity to organize itself into a legal corporation, to acquire, improve and
dispose of property, and to remain secure from forces that would
prejudicially affect its free exercise of the chosen form of religion.,
The permissive and security powers of the State are crucial to, and
must be invoked for, the maintenance of religious liberty in our societal
system.
"In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality
and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is
conceded to all."'2
Anson Phelps Stokes has noted that "though constitutions, statutes, and
court decisions have on the whole tried to be scrupulously fair and
impartial in dealing with all religious bodies, and the State has not
recognized any specific form of religion, it has nevertheless been
favorable to all agencies which promote the religious spirit and which
remain loyal to the government."3 Most American legal authorities
* Tih article comprises a portion of the author's University of Wisconsin Ph.D.
dissertation in political science entitled Church-State Relations in Wisconsin.
Other articles from this dissertation are Public Transportation of Parochial
School Pupils, published in 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 64, and Religious Education of
Public School Pupils in Wisconsin, to be published in the March, 1953 issue of
the Wisconsin Law Review.
**B.A., College of Wooster (1947); M.A., University of Wisconsin (1949);
Formerly, Instructor in Political Science, University of Florida (1950), Grin-
nell College (1951-1952) ; Presently, recipient of a grant from the Fund For
Adult Education of the Ford Foundation.
1 "As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of
others, society has jurisdiction over it .. " JOHN S. MILL, ON LmEzTY 75(Alburey Castell ed. New York, 1947).
2 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871).
3 3 STozs, CHURCH AND STATr IN THE UNITED STATES 369 (New York, 1950).
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ever stand ready, therefore, to protect each religious institution in the
exercise of its corporate powers,4 in its right to receive religious be-
quests in trust, and in its exemption from taxation of at least a portion
of its property.5
CORPORATE POWERS
A major corollary of the principle of separation of Church and
State is that Church and State must engage in some relations with one
another, while each keeps within its sphere, in order to insure the in-
violate nature of religious freedom. This corollary has been operative
in Wisconsin from a time even prior to statehood. It has revolved about
the security of property of religious institutions within the state. As
will become apparent, the property rights of religious institutions in
Wisconsin are fundamental to any discussion of Church-State relations
that focuses upon the corporate existence of religious institutions.
Legislative Policy
Before statehood, the territorial legislature of Wisconsin had pro-
vided no procedure for the incorporation of religious societies. In this
respect it did not differ from most other legislative bodies. W. G.
Torpey has explained the unincorporated status of religious societies,
as follows:
"The simplicity of procedure did not necessitate the adoption of
corporate forms. Further, religious corporations, as they were
known at common law, were not looked upon with favor by the
early inhabitants of America. In their minds religious corpora-
tions were associated to a great degree with the idea of a union
of church and state. Therefore the disposition was to give no
recognition to them in law. As a practical matter, early religious
societies existed for nearly all of the purposes for which they
later were incorporated."6
Though not providing for incorporation, the Wisconsin Territorial
Legislature did pass, in 1839, "an act to secure religious societies . . .
in the possession of their churches and other property," which provided,
in part:
"That all lands conveyed by deed, devise or otherwise to any
trustee or trustees for the use of any religious society within this
territory for the purposes of erecting a house or houses of
worship, for the minister to live in, or for a burying ground,
shall descend in perpetuity to their successors in office appointed
by said societies respectively, according to their respective rules
4 TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 82-117 (Chapel
Hill, 1948).
5 Id. at 171-97, 307-25.
6 Id. at 83. See, also, TYLER, RELIGIOUS SOcIErIES 54-9 (New York, 1866). See, 3
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 414 (New York, 1950) for
text of President Madison's famous veto, of 1811, of an act "incorporating the
Protestant Episcopal Church" in the District of Columbia.
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and regulations, for ever, for the use and purposes above
stated." 7
The constitutional conventions of 1846 and 1847 were barren of any
discussion of the subject of incorporating religious societies, but in 1849
the new state legislature comprehensively provided procedure for in-
corporation. Section 1 provided:
"It shall be lawful for all persons of full age, belonging to
any church, congregation, or religious society, not already in-
corporated, to assemble at the church or meeting-house... and
by a plurality of votes to elect any number of discreet persons of
their church . ..as trustees, to take charge of the estate and
property belonging thereto, and to transact all affairs relative to
the temporalities thereof."18
By this section the legislature was holding out an open invitation to all
unincorporated religious societies to attain corporate status. Sections
2, 3, 4 and 5 delineated the procedure to be followed in the election of
trustees. Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 were devoted to the corporate powers
of the trustees, including the powers to sue and be sued, to alter, repair
and improve buildings, and to make rules and orders in the management
of temporal affairs. Sections 10 through 17 contained detailed mis-
cellaneous provisions concerning the holding and recording of meetings
of trustees and the general procedure with which they should be
conducted. The trustees of any church were also authorized to execute
and record a certificate, stating therein the name of the church, where-
upon it "shall be a body corporate ... with all the rights, powers and
privileges of other religious corporations...-I
Examining the act of 1849 from a Church-State frame of reference,
it is apparent that the legislature adopted the policy to encourage the
formation of religious societies in such a manner as would protect the
freedom of worship, especially with respect to each church's property
interests. The state of Wisconsin has never deviated from this policy.
It has apparently been concerned with extending certain procedural
guaranties to church organizations so that their memberships would be
satisfied that justice, or at least certain basic elements of what might be
called "due process," prevailed in the decision-making process of church
management. But the legislature was to find, apparently, that certain
religious bodies could not readily comply with the uniformity required
7 WIscoNsN TERRITORIAL STATUTES 136 (1839). See, Strong v. Doty, 32 Wis.
381 (1873).8 Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 47, sec. 1 (1849). Chapter 47 of the 1849 statutes under-
went a general revision in 1876. According to a note appended to chapter 91,
sec. 1990 of the 1898 statutes, "The revisers of 1878 in their note said: 'Ch. 411,
1876, is taken to have intended a revision of the law for the incorporation of
religious societies. The privilege of organizing a corporation is extended to
all classes of denominations, it not being supposed the law means to be in-
tolerant of any religious belief or to be partial in its offer of privileges.'
9 Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 47, sec. 23 (1849).
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by the statutes concerning religious corporations without drastically
altering their governments. Consequently, the legislature has enacted
special provisions pertaining to specified denominations. Thus, today,
the statutes provide for special incorporation of each Protestant Epis-
copal church, Congregational church, Church of Christ or Christian
church, and Roman Catholic church.'"
Religious corporations, therefore, are constituted in different ways
in Wisconsin. The state legislature has provided for several methods
acceptable to different ecclesiastical organizations. Thus, provision is
made for "rectors, wardens and vestrymen being the trustees of each
Protestant Episcopal church,"" "the adult members, not less than three
in number, of any Congregational church,"'12 and "the bishop of each
diocese, being the only trustee of each Roman Catholic church in his
diocese."'1 3 One leading authority has commented:
3
0 Wis. STAT. secs. 187.04, 187.10, 187.11, 187.12 (1951). Other basic modifications
are reflected in sections 187.05 *and 187.16. Section 187.05 pertains to incorpora-
tion of religious organizations other than churches, namely, "any diocesan
council or convention, conference, synod or other body of authorized repre-
sentatives of any church or religious denomination or association or congrega-
tion thereof. . . ." Section 187.16 provides for incorporation of "any corps of
the Salvation Army in the state of Wisconsin ... " See, also, sec. 187.13 con-
cerning "missionary corporations."
11Wis. STAT. sec. 187.04 (1951). This section was formerly ch. 91, sec. 1997, of
the 1898 statutes which had a note appended thereto, as follows: "In their note
to this section the revisers of 1878 said: 'These are retained as peculiar pro-
visions heretofore deemed necessary. But it will be observed of this chapter
that it leaves every corporation free to incorporate in its by-laws all the pecu-
liar rules and usages of the sect or denomination to which it belongs, and to
order and govern its trustees by such laws as they shall make unto themselves,
providing only the opportunity to hold and manage church property under
artificial legal existence with the least possible restriction in 
detail.'"
12 WIs. STAT. sec. 187.10 (1) (1951).
23 WIS. STAT. sec. 187.12(1) (1951). For cases relating to Roman Catholic cor-
porations, see: In re McCanna's Estate, 230 Wis. 561, 284 N.W. 502 (1939);
St. Hyacinth Congregation v. Borucki, 141 Wis. 205, 124 N.W. .284 (1910);
Katzer v. City of Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N.W. 745 (1899) ; Heiss v. Vos-
burg, 59 Wis. 532, 18 N.W. 463 (1884). In St. Hyacinth Congregation v.
Bcrucki, supra, the claim was made that the statutory provision pertaining to
special incorporation of congregations of the Roman Catholic Church, as well
as other special, provisions, were invalid as granting special corporate privileges
and powers. For the Court, Judge Siebecker replied: "The statute does no
more than to take cognizance of the fact that there are voluntary associations
with different systems of government to which members thereof voluntarily
consent. The law therefore refrains from imposing any restrictions on the
right of the members to frame any form of organization and to adopt any
form of government for the conduct of its members and the administration of
its affairs not repugnant to the constitutional guaranties establishing freedom
of worslip and liberty of conscience. . . . The law operates generally and
equally throughout the state on all citizens who consent to unite themselves
with any of the different voluntary religious organizations." 141 Wis. 205, 215-6,
124 N.W. 284, 288 (1910); see, infra, note 14. See, also, TORPEY, JUDICIAL
DOCTRINES OF RIauGous RIGHs N AMERICA 89-90, for a discussion of three
forms of incorporation; "the corporation aggregate for congregational types of
churches; the revised corporation sole f6r monarchical types of chuches; and
the trustee corporation for intermediate churches." According to Carl Zollmann:
"it is now apparent that there are three forms of church corporations in full
bloom in the states of the Union. Of these the corporation sole- serves the
necessities of those churches who [sic!] believe in vesting their bishops or
[Vol. 36
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"It is characteristic of our American system with its many
states and its different historic Church traditions that no single
hard and fast incorporation practice has been followed, but that
provision has been made to meet varying needs and convictions
as long as certain legal safeguards are secured to protect both
the State and its citizens."' 14
Judicial Policy
The supreme court of Wisconsin has been consistent in maintaining
that a religious corporation may not divert the use of its property to
uses inconsistent with the purposes of the corporation. Most of the
prominent supreme court cases concerning religious corporations have
involved the question of diversion of church property. In deciding this
basic question, arising from variable fact situations, the judiciary has
permanently etched its relation with religious institutions upon the
public law of Wisconsin. The judges have emerged as protectors of
church property rights.
The state supreme court has clearly enunciated its role in case after
case. In the oft-cited case of Franke v. Mann,'5 the Court addressed
itself to the query whether a majority of the members of a church
organization Could devote its property to a use inconsistent with the
purposes of the corporation. In answering negatively for the Court,
Judge Marshall stated that there is no difference between a church and
another corporation insofar as neither can divert its property to uses
contrary to its incorporating act. With respect to the role of the courts,
he said:
"Church corporations are creatures of the law the same as
business or municipal corporations, and when it comes to
property rights a court of equity has the same power to protect
the minority in the one as in the other. If every taxpayer in a
city but one were to favor the use of public property for a purely
similar dignitaries with large discretion in matters of property. The trustee
corporation is adapted to the needs of those churches who [sic!] are somewhat
more democratic without being congregational, while the membership corpora-
tion represents the triumph of democratic government in church affairs and
fills the wants of those churches which vest complete control of church prop-
erty directly in the congregations." AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 126-7 (St. Paul,
1933).
14 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNrrED STATES 405. The question may be
asked whether specific provisions in chapter 187 of the Wisconsin statutes for
incorporating certain religious denominations violate the constitutional re-
quirement of uniformity in the application of state law. Article XI, section 1,
of the Wisconsin Constitution, it should be noted, provides that: "Corporations
without banking powers or privileges may be formed under general laws, but
shall not be created by special act, except ... in cases where, in the judgment
of the legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under
general laws." This provision, it would seem, is sufficiently broad to permit
the legislature to provide for special incorporation of those churches where
the legislature deems that general incorporation would impose an undue burden
upon church government. (See, supra, note 13.)
15 106 Wis. 118, 81 N.W. 1014 (1900).
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private use, the one, backed by the power of the court, would
prevail. If all the stockholders of a business corporation but one
were to favor the use of the corporate property for something
entirely foreign to the purposes of the corporation, the one
stockholder, with right on his side, and the power of the court
to enforce it, would control and prevent the mischief. The
power of a religious corporation as to the use of its property is
limited by its organic act the same as any other. When it exceeds
such limitations its acts are ultra vires, and the court, at the suit
of a member of it, will apply the proper preventative or restor-
ative remedy where there are no superior equities in the way."16
A religious society, incorporated under the laws of the state, has
been defined, therefore, as a civil corporation, governed by the statutes
and such rules of the common law as may be applicable.1 7 But such a
corporation may only consist of a single church or congregation, accord-
ing to the Court's decision in Evenson v. Ellingson.' In that case the
Court held that the statutes may not be construed to permit the for-
mation of a religious corporation out of two separate churches and
congregations with the trustees of one corporation governing the tem-
poral affairs of both. To hold otherwise, Judge Orton cautioned, would
mean that a religious corporation may be formed "by and over fifty or
one hundred" churches or congregations.
"The large churches and congregations might elect a majority of
such trustees and the officers of the corporation, and might
thereby crush out and destroy the weaker churches utterly and
take away their property. Besides the place of meeting of such a
mammoth corporation to elect trustees or to do any other
corporate business, would be distant from and inconvenient to
most of the churches and congregations."' 9
16 106 Wis. at 129, 81 N.W. at 1018. "The governing idea in all such cases is that
property held by the trustees of a church society has impressed upon it a char-
acter in harmony with the creation of the trust, and any change of such char-
acter is a violation of such-trust." 106 Wis. at 133, 81 N.W. at 1019. "When
such use is for the promotion of the doctrines and discipline of some particular
denomination, courts will prevent diversion to the support of a different and
inconsistent one, if even a single individual legally interested objects." Cape v.
Plymouth Congregational Church, 130 Wis. 174, 179-80, 109 N.W. 928, 929
(1906). See, also, 17 Ops. Wis. A-rr'Y GEN. 588 (1928).
17 Fadness v. Braunborg, 75 Wis. 257, 284-5, 41 N.W. 84, 92 (1889). It has also
been defined, in the general sense, as a body of persons who usually meet in
some stated place for the worship of God and religious instruction; a society
maintained for the support of public worship. United States National Bank v.
Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christ, 148 Wis. 613, 135 N.W. 121 (1913).
1s67 Wis. 634, 31 N.W. 342 (1887) ; reaffirmed: 72 Wis. 242, 39 N.W. 330 (1888).
19 67 Wis. at 642-3, 31 N.W. at 345. "Such a corporation would be contrary to the
policy of our institutions, which is that the affairs of our civil and political
bodies corporate shall be transacted near the people, and their meetings held
in places easily accessible to the people and electors, and that such bodies shall
not embrace more territory than necessary, so that the people shall not be
subject to foreign tribunals and shall be able to enjoy their liberties and dis-
charge their civil duties near their homes." 67 Wis. at 643, 31 N.W. at 345.
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Such a corporation would likely promote "schism and disagreements,"
said Judge Orton, and would always keep the churches "embroiled and
troubled."
Established Wisconsin judicial policy requires that the statutes
relating to the incorporation of religious societies be at least substan-
tially complied with in order to create such a corporation. 20 Thus, due
public notice of a meeting for the election of trustees and the incor-
poration of a religious society is necessary to make the procedure valid;
and certainty of the time and place of meeting is required.21
"These provisions are intended to secure certainty in the notice,
and certainty in the place of election, so as to give all members
or hearers entitled to vote an opportunity to be present at the
election, and to express their views or declare their preferences
in that way. They are designed to secure fairness and to prevent
fraudulent or improper practices in the election, and are, there-
fore, imperative in their character ... 22
The trustees of a religious corporation are, according to the Wis-
consin supreme court, "mere agents" to carry out the will of the
corporators, or a majority of them, as to all matters within the scope
of the corporation.23 To legally bind a corporation, the trustees must
act officially under authority conferred at official meetings.24 A religious
corporation may authorize its select body of trustees, by a vote, to enter
into a contract,25 which may include the authority to borrow money,26
20 Kulinski v. Dambrowski, 29 Wis. 109 (1871).
21 "Public notice of the time and place of holding the first meeting of such cor-
poration shall be given to the members of the church, sect or denomination for
two successive Sabbaths on which such church, sect or denomination shall
statedly meet for public worship, previous to such meeting; such notice may
be given by the minister or by one of the elders, deacons, church wardens or
vestrymen thereof, or if there be no such officers then by any member...
Wis. STAT. sec. 187.01(4) (1951).22 Kulinski v. Dambrowski, 29 Wis. 109, 114 (1871). For cases concerning notice
of meetings, see also: Spiritual & Philosophical Temple v. Vincent, 127 Wis.
93, 105 N.W. 1026 (1906); Franke v. Mann, 106 Wis. 118, 81 N.W. 1014(1900); Holm v. Hohm, 81 Wis. 374, 51 N.W. 579 (1891); West Koshkonong
Congregation v. Ottesen, 80 Wis. 62, 49 N.W. 24 (1891).
23 Kulinski v. Dambrowski, 29 Wis. 109, 115 (1871).
24 Leonard v. Lent, 43 Wis. 83 (1877) ; United Brethren Church of New London
v. Vandusen, 37 Wis. 54 (1875) ; Dennison v. Austin, 15 Wis. 334 (1862). See,
Wis. STAT. secs. 187.01(5), 187.10(5), 187.12(2), and 187.13(3) (1951).
25 In re McCanna's Estate, 230 Wis. 561, 284 N.W. 502 (1939) ; Methodist Episco-
pal Church of Sun Prairie v. Sherman, 36 Wis. 404 (1874); Charboneau v.
Henni, 24 Wis. 250 (1869).26 Dennison v. Austin, 15 Wis. 334 (1862). A note executed by church trustees
separately, and at different times and places, for money borrowed for the cor-
poration, without any previous vote at a legal meeting of the board authoriz-
ing the loan or the execution of the note, although it describes them as such
trustees, will be binding upon them as individuals, but not upon the corpora-
tion. Ibid. Even at an authorized official meeting, church trustees cannot act
for the corporation to bind it for an adverse interest of their own, as by giv-
ing a note to third parties in which is included certain claims in favor of them-
selves against the corporation. United Brethren Church of New London v.
Vandusen, 37 Wis. 54 (1875). But a religious corporation may ratify the un-
1953]
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and to appoint or remove a minister or pastor.27 The supreme court has
also held that a religious corporation is liable for its acts, the same as
other, corporations.28 Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
rejected the general rule that "a religious corporation is like a charitable
organization in the sense that, for injuries caused by the negligence of
its servants or agents, it is not liable for damages. ' 29 Instead, it has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the civil courts of the state will
apply civil remedies to the disputes of religious bodies unless the laws
of such bodies provide for specific ecclesiastical remedies.2 0
Judicial Concern With Differences of Creed
Although the Wisconsin supreme court has always been reluctant
to inquire into differences of creed or belief within or between religious
authorized acts of one claiming to be its agent which will operate as though
previous authority had been given. Moody & Meckelburg Co. v. Trustees of
M. E. Church of Port Washington, 99 Wis. 49, 74 N.W. 572 (1878). A sale of
church property, therefore, which was in good faith authorized and after-
wards ratified at meetings attended only by those of the majority faction, but
of which meetings all of both factions had actual notice, was valid and binding
upon the congregation. Lutheran Trifoldighed Congregation of Neenah v. St.
Paul's English Evangelical Lutheran Congregation of Neenah, 159 Wis. 56,
150 N.W. 190 (1914). See, also, Bahr v. Evangelical Lutheran St. John's So-
ciety of Poynette, 256 Wis. 490, 295 N.W. 700 (1941), where, in an action to
foreclose a mortgage given by a church to secure a loan for the purchase of a
parsonage, the evidence sustained a judgment of foreclosure and sale of both
the parsonage and church property covered by the mortgage on the ground
that members of the congregation had authorized the president and secretary
to execute a mortgage covering the church property as well as the parsonage
property.
27 Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Congregation v. Hass, 177 Wis. 23, 187 N.W.
677 (1922) ; Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Congregation v. Jaeger, 177 Vis.
34, 187 N.W. 681 (1922); Rubush v. Buss. 184 Wis. 439, 198 N.W. 608 (1924).28 Thus,. the safe place statute [now Wis. STAT. sec. 101.06 (1951)] applies to
churches and religious corporations. Zimmers v. St. Sebastian's Congregation
of Milwaukee, 258 Wis. 496, 46 N.W. 2d 820 (1951); Jaeger v. Evangelical
Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation, 219 Wis. 209, 262 N.W. 585 (1935) ; Wil-
son v. Evangelical Lutheran Church oi Reformation of Milwaukee, 202 Wis.
111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930). See. also, Mitterhansen v. South Wisconsin Ass'n
of Seventh Day Adventists, 245 Wis. 353, 14 N.W. 2d 19 (1944) ; Sheehy v.
Blake, 72 Wis. 411, 39 N.W. 479 (1888), 77 Wis. 394, 46 N.W. 537 (1890) ; and
Niebuhr v. Piersdorff, 24 Wis. 316 (1869), for discussion of the extent of
liability of trustees; and of charitable corporations generally, see: R. W. Han-
sen, Damage Liability of Charitable Corporations, 19 MARQ. L. REV. 92-105
(1934).29 TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELirious RIGHTS IN AMERICA 94. "The prin-
ciple upon which charitable corporations were held not liable for the acts of
their servants involved considerations of public policy." Ibid., 94-5. See, F. J.
Graham, Negligence: Religious Societies, Charities, 15 MARQ. L. REv. 54-5
(1930).
30 Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Congregation v. Hass, 177 Wis. 23, 187 N.W.
677 (1922). Concerning the action by one faction of a church to oust another
faction from control, the Court said: "This action was without notice, without
hearing, and without evidence; and, while the civil courts will studiously give
full effect to the judgment of an ecclesiastical court when matters ecclesiastical
only are involved, when civil rights as to prop.erty are involved the civil courts
will insist that an accusation be made, that notice be given, and an opportunity
to produce witnesses and defend be afforded, before they will give effect to an
expulsion or suspension of the. kind here attempted." West Koshkonong Con-
gregation v. Ottesen, 80 Wis. 62, 75, 49 N.W. 24, 28 (1891).
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societies, it has found it necessary to undertake such an inquiry in those
cases which involved property or contract rights.31 Usually, the out-
come of such cases has hinged upon whether property has been diverted
from its corporate purpose. The court often has found it necessary to
review the history of the religious institutions concerned in the minute
development of their creeds and official acts. The reported statements
of facts of such cases are consequently often complex. This is especially
true when a proper disposition of the case requires the court to consider
differences of opinion held by the parties as to interpretation of religious
doctrines and beliefs, and whether church discipline has been properly
applied. Thus, the court must scrutinize with care the history of the
congregations, the changes in name, if any, over a period of many years,
and events from prior to incorporation up to the moment the litigation
began. One would guess that these cases try the patience of judges and
that they might desire to be spared the consideration of such cases.
The question yet remains: why are Wisconsin courts reluctant to
inquire into differences of creed within or between religious societies ?32
Actually, Wisconsin courts are not "reluctant" to inquire, but rather
they "decline" to inquire into differences of creed except when property
rights are involved. To do otherwise, a court in effect would be in-
voking that power of the state government which the judiciary exercises
in support of one creed against another insofar as determination in
favor of one religious faction against another rests upon the interpre-
tation of a religious creed. There is nothing "personal" on the part of
judges in this, it would appear. Religious societies are no different in
this respect from fraternal or agricultural societies, for instance-for
the courts will not inquire into their doctrines either except when
property rights are involved. Thus, it is not within a court's jurisdiction,
it would seem, to inquire solely into the religious side of religious con-
troversies. The separation of Church and State involved in this policy
apparently derives from those provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution
that protect freedom of worship.33
3 1 Kerler v. Evangelical Emanuel's Church of Hales Corners, 235 Wis. 209, 292
N.W. 887 (1932); Wisconsin Universalist Convention v. Union Unitarian &
Universalist Soc. of Prairie du Sac, 152 Wis. 147, 130'N.W. 753 (1913) ; Martin
v. Board of Directors German Reformed Church of Peace of Washington
Co., 149 Wis. 19, 134 N.W. 1125 (1912); Marien v. Evangelical Creed Congre-
gation of Milwaukee, 132 Wis. 650, 113 N.W. 66 (1907); Cape v. Plymouth
Congregational Church, 130 Wis. 174, 109 N.W. 928 (1906) ; Franke v. Mann,
106 Wis. 118, 81 N.W. 1014 (1900); West Koshkonong Congregation'v. Otte-
sen, 80 Wis. 62, 49 N.W. 24 (1891); Fadness v. Braunborg, 73 Wis. 257, 41
N.W. 84 (1889).
32 There is no discoverable Wisconsin judicial opinion in which this question is
answered. It was posed to Marvin B. Rosenberry in an interview (Feb. 10,
1953 at his home: 81 Cambridge Rd., Madison, Wis.) and he has affirmed the
logic of the statement that follows. Judge Rosenberry has served 34 distin-
guished years on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
83 See, Wis. CoNsT. Art I, sec. 18.
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. Analysis _of one ,of, the simpler cases, Marien v. Evangelical Creed
Congregation of Milwaukee,". may illustrate the nature of judicial
inquiry into ,differences of creed.. A, religious corporation, the Evan-
gelical -Creed Congregation, had- purchased real estate upon which
church buildings Were erected. The property had been acquired for that
church as -a member of- the- Wisconsin District of the German Evan-
gelical- Synod of North Americ, "for use in support of the creed, tenets,
and polityo'f that 6rganization." A minority of the members of the
church commenced di' action in the Circuit Court for MilwaukeeC t ty L ... ' -, ....i
Cunty, comilainfg that the officers of the corporation had, by a
majority vote, attempted to divert the property and "pervert" the cor-
poration "to. the support of an inconsistent and conflicting synod, faith,
and creed" known as the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Wisconsin.
The complaint requested the Circuit Court to grant an injunction to
restrain the alleged diversion of church property. The defendants
ehtered.a demurrer to the complaint which the Circuit Court overruled,
and the defendants appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court from the
order overruling their demurrer.
For the Supreme Court, Judge Dodge delineated the policy of
Wisconsin courts with respect to disputes over religious creeds, as
follows:
"The only concern of courts with differences of creed or
belief within or between religious organizations is when some
property or contract rights are involved and demand protection.
It is, however, fully established by our own court, in common
with most others, that when property has been acquired, whether
by gift or purchase, for the maintenance and support of the
faith of any recognized denomination or church, every member
of the association acquiring it, corporate or unincorporated, has a
right to resist its diversion to other antagonistic uses, whether
secular or religious, and therefore those who hold the title or
control, whether a corporation or the officers of the association,
hold it charged with a trust to apply it to the uses for which
acquired and not to inconsistent ones." 35
Judge Dodge then turned his attention more specifically to the com-
plaint and recognized that it alleged that two associations of churches,
having their roots centuries ago in Germany, have been extended
throughout the United States. One has been known as tlae German
Evangelicals, and the other as the Evangelical Lutherans, each in turn
reflected in the Wisconsin District of the German Evangelical Synod of
North America, and the separate and distinct Evangelical Lutheran
Synod of North America. Judge Dodge took notice of the fact, further-
3 132 Wis. 650, 113 N.W. 66 (1907).
35 132 Wis. at 651, 113 N.W. at 67.
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more, that the-complaint alleged differences of creed -insofar as the latter
association:
". which' we sfiall h'ereafter designate as the Litheran church
or synod, adopts certain writings in and shortly after% the time of
Martin Luther'as conclusi~ve expression of the creed and inerrant
interpretation of the Scriptures, and rejects certain other
writings wh1i' are ad opted- by -wvhat was -called the German
Reformed, Church as correct interpretatio4- of. the Scriptures.
.The Evangelical. Church,-upon the other hand, recognizes equally
said symbolical books of- the Lutherans 'and of the Reformed
Church- but accords to neither conclusiveness as to the doctrines
'therei promulgated, oras-to the interpretations of the Scrip-
tures, but approves them' as the work of _hunian minds subject to
-what miy be deimedeliher by the individual or by the church
authorities the true meaning of the Scriptures themselves. ' 36
After analyzing severalother differences in creed and discipline of these
orgdnizati6ns ;:as set forth in the -complaint, Judge Dodge concluded
that th 'Co'urt th-'bdught i'"abuidantly alleged that the defendants are
t t pprii' , "eIt"on 'froperverting mte p{opg inq- e'st f r ,uses of the Evangelical Church
andt-:uses incb Sistet therewith and antagonistic thereto. ' 3  Hence,
a cause of action was stated "to invoke the power of a court of equity
to, restya',, ,te misapplication of the property." The Supreme Court
held, therdfore, that the, Circuit Court for Milwaukee County had
properly overruled the demurrer to the complaint.38
In conclusion, it may be said that-properly viewed, religious in-
corporation is a right, rather than a measure of state control, because of
the bvious benefits that'accrtie' to religious institutions upon achieving
corporate 'status. 17hat Wisconsin s religious institutions themselves
regard incorporation in this light is evident, moreover, from the fact
that there'exists no discoverable instance of a religious society having
ever challenged the state's authority to provide for incorporation, or to
inquire into differences of ceed when property is involved. Incorpora-
tion is a statutory right accorded by the state, and both state and church
benefit thereby to the extent that an approximation of orderly and
harmonious relations between them is afforded.
36 132 Wis. at'653-4, 113 NW. at 67.- --
3 132 Wis,. at 655, 113 N.W. at 68.
38Ibid Other- pertinent cases "involving Wisconsin religious societies, not other-
wise referred to, are: Evangelische'Luth. St. Thomas Gemeinde v. Congrega-
tion German Evang.,Luth. St. Matthews Church of Milwaukee, 191 Wis. 340,
210 N.W. 942, (1926) ; Masbruch v. von Oehsen, 163 Wis. 208, 157 N.W. 775
(1916); Munson v. Bringe, 146 Wis. 393, 131 N.W. 904 (1911); Davenport v.
First Cong. Society, 33 Wis. 387 (1873) ; Trustees German Evangelical Con-
gregation of New Elm v. Hoessli, 13 Wis. 348 (1861). For the disposition of
miscellaneous issues, concerning religious corporations, by the Wisconsin at-
torney general, see: REPT. OF ATn'Y GEx. 279 (1904) ; REs'r. OF Ar'v GEN. 175,
176 (1912); 7 Ops. Wis. AT-'y GEN. 473 (1918); 11 Ops. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 189(1922) ; and 14 Ors. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 322, 331, 361 (1925).
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Two other major rights of religious institutions remain to be con-
sidered: the right to receive bequests in trust, and to be exempt from
property taxation. Both are statutory rights, also, as distinguished
from constitutional rights, although much of the law concerning reli-
gious bequests derives historically from the common law.
BEQUESTS TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
One of the primary rights of religious institutions in Wisconsin is
the right to receive bequests in trust for the support of religious
activities.3 9 Such bequests have been classified as charitable trusts, and
hence the American law concerning religious bequests is an integral part
of the American law of charities. The "most perfect definition" 40 of a
charity, in the legal sense, has been attributed to Justice Horace Gray
of Massachusetts who defined it as:
"a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws for the
benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing
their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion,
by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or restraint, by
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by creating or
maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the
burden of government. 4 1
One would guess that government would seek to encourage charities,
including the execution of religious bequests, but this has not always
been the case in Wisconsin.
Early Legislative Policy
In 1839, the Wisconsin territorial legislature declared that "none of
the statutes of Great Britain shall be considered as law of this
territory."' 2 In effect then, it repudiated the Statute of Elizabeth 43
which had enumerated valid charitable uses or purposes and vested in
the Lord Chancellor the final reviewing authority, in the exercise of
royal sovereign prerogative, to determine the validity of charitable
bequests. And ten years later, after Wisconsin became a state, the
39 "The term 'devise' is properly restricted to real property, and is not applicable
to testamentary dispositions of personal property, which are properly called
'bequests' or 'legacies.' But these terms may be construed interchangeably or
applied indifferently to either real or personal property, if the context shows
that such was the intention of the testator." BL. L. DiCr. 573 (3rd ed. 1933).4 0 ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHAarrEs 138 (Milwaukee, 1924). Note espe-
cially Zollmann's discussion of religious charities; ibid., 161-81. "The high
value of religion to the state is not the only reason why pious uses are recog-
nized. Religious societies, not being supported by the state, are dependent on
the contributions of individuals. The law, therefore, must consider such con-
tributions as in a peculiar degree charitable." Ibid., 164. See also, Zollmann,
Religious Charities in the American Law, 7 MARQ. L. REv. 131-48 (1922).
41 Jackson v. Philips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). See also, 2 PERRY, A TREATISE O1T
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 1183, n. 35 (7th ed. Boston, 1929).42 Wis. Laws of 1839, p. 407.
4343 Euiz. ch. 4.
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legislature borrowed from New York a provision 4 which, without in
any manner mentioning charitable trusts, abolished all uses and trusts
"except as authorized and modified by this chapter." 45 By not including
charitable trusts, it appeared that the Wisconsin legislature had not
only abolished them but also the English cy pres doctrine of liberal
construction of charitable bequests.
Implementation of the cy pres doctrine would have meant, according
to Carl Zollmann, that:
"No matter how vague or unlawful the charity contemplated
might be, if charity was intended, the courts would carry out this
intention by devising a scheme where the charity was vague, or
by designating a lawful charity where it was illegal. This
doctrine 'had its origin in the strong desire of the ecclesiastical
chancellors to uphold every gift to the church, and every act that
subjected property to its control.' The English cy pres doctrine,
in its inception, thus actually rested on a reasonable basis. The
one great and predominant intent of the testator was carried out,
though his particular directions were incapable of execution." 46
Bequests to religious institutions, and other charities, were bound
to be declared void for vagueness unless they fulfilled all the requisites
of definiteness required of all valid trusts. But this was impossible.
Charitable trusts, and thus bequests to religious institutions, necessarily
are indefinite as to the beneficiaries, and the cy pres doctrine could not
obtain to rescue such a trust in this state. According to William G.
Torpey:
"One of the features distinguishing a charitable trust from
other trusts is the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries. Persons to
be benefited should be uncertain until they are selected to be the
particular beneficiaries of the trust. In fact, indefiniteness and
uncertainty as to the individuals and members to be benefited are
often determining elements of a valid charitable trust. '47
"Religious uses are," moreover, "strictly analogous to other charitable
trusts in the important particular of indefiniteness of beneficiaries." 4
441 N. Y. REV. STAT. p. 727 (1829).4 5 Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 57 (1849).4 6 AMEUcAN LAW oF CHARITIES 71-2. See also, BL. L. Dicr. 497 (3rd ed. 1933).
Zollmann suggests that the cy pres doctrine failed adoption of in many states
because many colonists had come to America to escape religious persecution
in England, that the doctrine was associated with the Established Church -of
England and the royal prerogative, which had been renounced by the Declara-
tion of Independence and abrogated by the Revolutionary War, and that the
adoption of the separation of powers system had "actually prohibited American
courts from exercising a jurisdiction so purely discretionary." Zollmann, supra,
74-5.47 J UDICIAL DocRI-NEs oF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMECIcA 308-9.
4S ZOLLMAxN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES 164. "The individuals who attend
the services of any particular church are not limited to its members, but are an
indefinite and varying number of persons benefited by having their minds and
hearts brought under the influence of religion." Ibid.
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By implication, therefore, Wisconsin's policy toward organized
religion was seemingly unfriendly with respect to religious bequests. By
appearing to except charitable trusts as valid trusts the legislature had
also excepted bequests in trust to religious institutions. If this was
separation of Church and State it was the kind of separation that posed
a serious threat to the security of Wisconsin's religious institutions.
The threat appears all the more serious when it is considered that the
separation principle precludes the state from engaging in, or supporting
religious activities, (as distinguished from other charitable activities),
which are wholly dependent upon individual contributions; and many of
these, historically and currently, have been made in the form of
charitable bequests.
Judicial Construction 1876-1900
It was not until 1876 that the Wisconsin Supreme Court was con-
fronted with the question of the validity of a charitable bequest. In
Ruth v. Oberbrunner" the Court held invalid a devise of land "for the
use and benefit of the order of St. Dominican and St. Catherine's
Female Academy" located in the city of Racine. For the Court, Judge
Cole made much of the fact that neither organization was incorporated,
and consequently the Court had no criterion for ascertaining their
nature and purposes.50 An active charitable trust had not been created,
moreover, because the testatrix had not indicated any specific purpose
or charitable object.
At the same time, in Heiss v. Murphey,5 1 the Supreme Court
similarly held void a bequest "to the Roman Catholic orphans of the
diocese of La Crosse" on the ground that the testator designated no
ascertainable beneficiaries. The Court found it impossible to determine
whether the "orphans" to be benefited were those who had lost both
parents or only one, whether both parents were Catholic or only one,
and which one, the father or mother, and whether the "orphans"
included only those resident in the diocese at the time of the testator's
death or those also who might come into the diocese at a later time.
Judge Cole again refused, for the Court, to invoke the aid of liberal
construction which he associated with the cy pres doctrine. He said:
4940 Wis. 238 (1876).
50 " 'If, then, a bequest, unaccompanied by any designation of the purposes to
which it is to be applied, be made to a society whose name and public acts in-
dicate that its objects are religious or charitable, is there an implied trust
which limits the use of such objects? When the bequest is to a corporation,
there would seem to be some basis for such an implication, because, the ob-jects, purposes and powers of the corporation being in all cases more or less
clearly defined by its charter, the bequest may fairly be presumed to have been
intended for those specific objects."' 40 Wis. 238, 265, quoting Judge Selden
in Owens v. The Missionai-y Society, 14 N.Y. 380, 385-6 (1856).
5140 Wis. 276 (1876).
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"There are doubtless cases in which a devise or bequest to
charity as vague and uncertain as the one we are considering
has been sustained. But these cases mainly rest upon the doctrine
of cy pres, which is a doctrine of prerogative or sovereign
function, and not strictly a judicial power... It is not claimed
that the courts of this state are clothed with other than strictly
judicial power, or that they have succeeded to the jurisdiction
over charities which the chancellor in England exercises by
virtue of the royal prerogative and the cy pres power... It seems
to -as that a trust so wanting in all the elements of certainty and
precision cannot be enforced by a court acting only in the
exercise of judicial power.15 2
In line with these two decisions the Court, in 1888, declared void for
vagueness a gift "to the poor of the city of Green Bay" on the ground
that the testator did not specify whether he intended paupers or poor
persons who had not as yet become paupers.5 3 And two years later, in
the case of Will of Fuller 4 the Court likewise held invalid a bequest of
property "in trust to the deacons of the First Baptist Church of Janes-
ville, Wisconsin, and their successors in office, to be funded with good
security on improved land, and the interest to be paid annually to the
American Baptist Publication Society, located at Philadelphia, Pa., to
aid in the support of a Baptist colporteur and (or) missionary in the
state of Wisconsin." Among the reasons the Court assigned for its
decision were that the deacons were not incorporated, that they were
"constantly changing by death or removal from the city," that the
testator did not specify whether the missionary should service the whole
or part of the state, and if part, which part, and that the kind of publi-
cations he would distribute was not specified. 55
An interesting case was presented in McHugh v'. McCole 56 wherein
the Court held void for uncertainty bequests to the Roman Catholic
bishop of Green Bay "to be used by him for the benefit and behoof of
the Roman Catholic Church," and for masses for the repose of the
souls of the testator and certain named members of his family. These
provisions, said the Court, were incapable of being executed by a court
of equity.
52Id. at 292-3.
53 Estate of Hoffen, 70 Wis. 522, 36 N.W. 304 (1888).
5475 Wis. 431,44 N.W. 304 (1890).
55 75 Wis. at 437, 44 N.W. at 305. "Indeed, the difficulty is the testator has not
fully defined his charitable scheme in his will, but has left the whole matter so
indefinite and unexpressed that it is impossible for the court to carry it out;
and, before a court will carry into execution a charitable scheme, the scheme
itself 'must be sufficiently indicated, or a method provided whereby it may be
ascertained and its object made sufficiently certain to enable the court to en-
force the execution of the trust according to such scheme, and for such object.
It must be of such a tangible nature that the court can deal with it.'" 75 Wis.
at 437-8, 44 N.W. at 305.
56 97 Wis. 166, 72 N.W. 631 (1897).
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"Unless they can be so executed, they must necessarily fail;
for it is settled that the doctrine of cy pres-as it existed in
England and as it has been applied in some of the states ...,
whereby trust provisions are administered and executed as near
to the presumed intention of the donor or founder as may be-
is not recognized or acted upon by the courts of the state as a
part of the judicial power of the state. The doctrine rests upon
a prerogative of sovereign power, is not strictly judicial in its
nature, and consequently the courts of the state cannot recognizeit.,,57
No legal reason obstructs the execution of bequests for such masses
"when made in clear, direct, and legal form," however, and the English
rule, by which they were held invalid as gifts for superstitious uses, does
not obtain here.
To sum up, these cases held in effect that no trust is valid whether
charitable or otherwise and whether it involves real or personal property,
unless it is created to satisfy the statutory rule of definiteness required
of all valid private trusts in the statute of uses and trusts. They were
grounded upon the reasoning "that the doctrine of charitable uses does
not obtain to any extent in this state; that a trust not having all the
elements of certainty requisite to a private trust cannot be sustained
without the aid of the cy pres doctrine; that -a court of equity cannot
exercise any authority over a donation to charitable uses that it cannot
in case of a private trust, except by virtue of the prerogative power of
the sovereign, the so-called cy pres power, and that courts of this state
possess no such power.Y5 8
Fortunately for religious and other charitable institutions, however,
this was not the only line of decisions in Wisconsin. In Dodge v.
Williams5 9 the Court upheld as a valid charitable trust a bequest of an
estate to three named executors, as trustees, to pay and deliver the sum
of $5,000 each to Wisconsin Female College, Ripon College, and Beloit
College, for the purpose, among others, of "the education and training
of females," and a separate bequest for the organization "at the City of
Beaver Dam an institution of learning for the education and training of
females." These are valid charitable uses, said Chief Justice Ryan,
"clearly within the terms of the statute ...of Elizabeth," and it was
difficult to see how the scheme of the charity could be made more cer-
tain." A charitable use is essentially shifting. When a trust defines the
beneficiaries with certainty, it is rather private than public."60 The
statute of uses and trusts applies only to real property and private trusts,
was the reasoning. Here the bequest has created a charitable use, hence
57 97 Wis. at 173, 72 N.W. at 633.
58 Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 401-2, 83 N.W. 345, 350 (1900). See also, W.
L. Crow. Why Charitable Trusts Fail, 24 MARQ. L. REv. 126-38 (1940).
59 46 Wis. 70 (1879).GO Id. at 98.
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a public trust, and, by application of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, the real property is converted into personalty. Thus the statute of
uses and trusts does not apply. To the same effect was Gould v. Taylor
Orphan Asylum, 61 decided at the same time.
These two cases were instrumental in producing another line of
cases, prior to 1900, dealing with the question of definiteness. Accord-
ingly, the Court, in 1886, upheld a gift to a church, to relieve the resi-
dent poor, as being definite and certain enough to create a valid
charitable trust.62 In 1897 the Court sustained a donation for the
support, maintenance, education and aid of such indigent orphan chil-
dren in Rock County, under fourteen years of age, as the executors
may decide to be the most needy and deserving.63 And in Beurhaus v.
Cole,64 decided the same year, a gift to the City of Watertown for the
aged and poor was similarly upheld.
Harrington v. Pier
The two lines of decisions developed prior to 1900-beginning with
the Ruth and Heiss cases on the one hand, and Dodge v. Williams on
the other--were termed by Carl Zollmann as being "as dearly incon-
sistent as are darkness and light."65 But the turn of the century brought
a turn away from the vascillating policy of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court when it decided, in Harrington v. Pier,66 to return, at least par-
tially, to the English rule of liberal construction of charitable bequests.
In upholding a charitable bequest of a testator's net estate to certain
trustees, to expend in temperance work in the city of Milwaukee, Judge
Marshall, for the Court, adhered to the reasoning in Dodge v. Williams
which expressed an entirely different doctrine than that set forth in the
Ruth and Heiss line of cases. The significance of this departure may be
fully appreciated by Judge Marshall's reference to the controversial
cy pres doctrine:
"Bequests of personal property to charitable purposes, good by
the rules of the common law, except so far as affected by the
cy pres remedy and doctrine of the statute of 43 Eliz. ch. 4, are
good under the laws of this state. When it is said that the
doctrine of cy pres does not prevail in this state, that does not
refer to those liberal rules of judicial construction of charitable
trusts by courts of equity, which prior to the statute of Elizabeth
were applied in chancery, and of which such statute is only
confirmatory, but to the prerogative power exercisable where
such statute prevails. Courts here, as anciently, look with favor
6146 Wis. 106 (1879).
62 Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353 (1886).
63 Sawtelle v. Witham, 94 Wis. 412, 69 N.W. 72.
64 94 Wis. 617,69 N.W. 986 (1897).
65 Cross Currents in the Wisconsin Charity Doctrine, 8 MARQ. L. REv. 168, 171
(1924).
66 105 Wis. 485, 82 N.W. 345 (1900).
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upon all donations to charitable uses, and give effect to them
where it is possible to do so consistent with rules of law, and to
that end the most liberal rules the nature of the case will admit
of, within the limits of ordinary chancery jurisdiction, will be
resorted, to if necessary.
'67
After salvaging part of the cy pres doctrine Judge Marshall stated
the rule that so long as the bequest creates a trust and discloses a
particular charitable purpose, as distinguished from a gift to charity
generally, it is sufficiently definite as a valid charitable trust. The court
may even proceed so far as to appoint a trustee, if one is not designated.
The trustee may select the actual beneficiaries, within the class specified
by the donor, and fill in the details of the scheme within the declared
purpose .6  With respect to the definiteness of beneficiaries, a question
that considerably troubled the pre-1900 court, Judge Marshall said:
"Certainty of beneficiaries who can invoke judicial power to
enforce the trust is not only unnecessary, but is inconsistent with
the very nature of a trust for charitable uses, in that the bene-
ficiaries, in a general sense, are the members of the public at
large. A public charity, within the rule mentioned, is sufficiently
definite as to program if its general nature be clearly stated, or if
it can be made otherwise certain by the trustees clothed with the
power of administering the trust within the limits of the declared
purpose. It is sufficiently definite as to immediate beneficiaries,
by the power of selection lodged expressly or impliedly in the
trustee appointed by the donor, or by the court where there is a
trust but no trustee. If the trustee abuse his power, there is a
complete remedy by the exercise of the visitorial power of the
state. The statute of uses and trusts, as to personal property,
at least, does not apply to trusts for charitable uses. ' 69
A large portion of judge Marshall's opinion was devoted to harmon-
izing and distinguishing all the cases in the Ruth and Heiss line of
decisions, except Will of Fuller, which was disapproved. The position
was taken that the reasoning in all prior cases in conflict with the instant
opinion is superseded by the latter.7 0
67 105 Wis. at 503-4, 82 N.W. at 351.
68 105 Wis. at 504, 82 N.W. at 351.
69 Ibid. "It follows that indefiniteness of beneficiaries who can invoke judicial
authority to enforce the trust, want of a trustee if there be a trust in fact, or
indefiniteness in details of the particular purpose declared, the general limits
being reasonably ascertainable, or indefiniteness of mode of carrying out the
particular purpose, does not militate against the validity of a trust for charit-
able uses. Given a trust, with or without a trustee, a particular purpose-as
education, or relief of the poor, as distinguished from a bequest to charity
generally-and a class great or small, and without regard to location, neces-
sarily, as 'worthy indigent females,' or 'indigent young men studying for the
ministry,' or 'resident poor,' or 'indigent children of Rock County,' or 'the boys
and girls of California' . . . and we have a good trust for charitable uses." 105
Wis. at 514, 82 N.W. at 355.
70 Careful analysis of Judge Marshall's full opinion will reveal that Carl Zoll-
mann was in error when he stated that "the first line of decisions was in ex-
press terms overruled." Cross Currents in the Wisconsin Charity Doctrine, 8
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Recent History
Now that personal property had been indelibly made subject to the
liberal charity rule by the Harrington v. Pier decision, the task re-
mained to accomplish the same end with respect to real property. This
requires brief consideration of the development of the doctrine of per-
petuities in relation to property devised to charitable uses.
Ruth v. Oberbrunner7 ' had decided that the doctrine of perpetuities,
so far as it refers to the length of time for which a piece of property
may be held, is applicable to property granted or devised to charitable
uses. The legislature reacted, in 1878, by amending the perpetuity
statute to permit grants or devises "to literary or charitable corpora-
tions. '' 72 But every charitable use was not included, such as one in-
volving, for instance, an unincorporated religious society. Dodge v.
Williams 3 and Harrington v. Piere4 established that the doctrine of
perpetuities was limited to real estate, and did not include personal
property' in that the statute abolished the English doctrine of perpe-
tuities as applicable to personalty. Thus the law remained in Hood v.
Dorer75 and Danforth v. Oshkosh76 which upheld, respectively, a
bequest "for the support and maintenance of superannuated preachers
of the church denominated the United Brethren in Christ," and a gift
of real estate to the City of Oshkosh as an absolute gift. But in the
latter case, Judge Marshall appealed directly to the legislature, in his
concurring opinion, to declare that real estate given to a charitable pur-
pose is exempt from the perpetuity rule.77 Consequently, in 1905, the
MARQ. L. REv. 168, 171 (1924). This can only be said of the decision of Will
of Fuller. Thus did judge Marshall distinguish McHugh v. McCole by viewing
the decision in that case as based on the ground that a trust for masses is a
private, rather than a valid public or charitable, trust. "'So viewed, the de-
cision is in harmony with Dodge v. Williams, and whatever was said incon-
sistent with such view must yield to the decision itself and to the established
doctrine of this state distinguishing trusts for charitable uses from private
trusts." 105 Wis. at 513, 82 N.W. at 354.
7140 Wis. 238 (1876).
72 Wis. Rr-v. SarAT. sec. 2039 (1878).
7 3 46 Wis. 70 (1879).
74 105 Wis. 485, 82 N.W. 345 (1900).
75 107 Wis. 149, 82 N.W. 546 (1900). "In disposing of the case the trial judge
held the will void on the ground of uncertainty and indefiniteness, relyng upon
the case of Will of Fuller .... Were the rule of that case to be followed, it
is not easy to see how the conclusion reached by the trial judge could be
avoided. In the recent case of Harrington v. Pier... , however, the doctrine
of the Fuller Case was substantially overruled." 107 Wis. at 152, 82 N.W. at
547-8.
76 119 Wis. 262, 97 N.W. 258 (1903).
77 "It is now, seemingly, up to the legislature, as it was in New York in 1893, to
say whether a broad policy as to devises of property to charity shall prevail in
this state, or not. It will in the light of the decision in this case, be unmistak-
able that if the public desire is that men of wealth shall at least be permitted
to have a free hand in devoting their property to the benefit of mankind instead
of to mere selfish or private ends, legislative aid or command must be had in
the matter." 119 Wis. at 311, 97 N.W. at 276.
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perpetuity statute was again amended-this time by inserting as an
exemption real estate "given, granted or devised to a charitable use."78
Meanwhile, the Court had not only followed Harrington v. Pier in
the Hood and Danforth cases, but expressly approved that decision in
Kronshage v. Varrell.70 The next relevant case was In re Kavanaugh's
Estate,80 perhaps the most important case in Wisconsin's history so far
as is concerned the validity of a religious bequest within the large
context of Church-State relations.
James Kavanaugh had provided in his will that: "After the payment
of my just debts and funeral expenses, I give, devise and bequeath all
the rest of my property for masses for the repose of my father's and
mother's and sister's and brother's and my own soul." The county court
held this provision void on the basis of the decision in McHugh v.
McCole,81 to the effect that a bequest for masses is too indefinite as a
private trust for a court of equity to execute. On appeal, the circuit
court for Manitowoc County affirmed the judgment of the county court
from which an appeal was taken to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The main question before the Supreme Court was whether the
bequest for masses is a public charity and sufficiently definite for en-
forcement by a court of equity. On this point Judge Kerwin, for the
majority, said:
"It was shown by competent evidence that the sacrifice of the
mass is a public service, not alone for the repose of the souls of
the deceased members mentioned, but for the benefit of all man-
kind, and so understood by all members of the Catholic Church.
So while the masses may be intended to benefit the souls of the
departed mentioned, the benefits are public as well, therefore
come within the designation of a public charity. Masses are
religious observances and come within the religious or pious
uses which are upheld as public charities."8' 2
Judge Kerwin added that insofar as McHugh v. McCole conflicts with
anything said in this opinion "it must be regarded as overruled," and
judgment of the court below, therefore, was reversed. 83
7sWis. Laws ch. 511, sec. 1 (1905), now Wis. STAT. sec. 230.15 (1951). For a thor-
ough review of this development see: Carl Zollmann, Development of the
Charity Doctrine in Wisconsin, I Wis. L. REV. 129 (1921).
79 120 Wis. 161, 97 N.W. 928 (1904).
80 143 Wis. 90, 126 N.W. 672 (1910).
8197 Wis. 166, 72 N.W. 631 (1897).
s 143 Wis. 90, 97, 126 N.W. 672, 675. Judge Kerwin cited the following Catholic
statement as authority: "'The mass is the unbloody sacrifice of the cross, and
the object for which it is offered up is in the first place, to honor and glorify
God; secondly, to thank Him for His favors; third, to ask His blessing;
fourth, to propitiate Him for the sins of mankind. The individuals who par-
ticipate in the fruits of the masses are the person or persons for whom the
mass is offered, all of those who assist at the mass, the celebrant himself, and
for all mankind.'" 143 Wis. at 98, 72 N.W. at 675. See, also, Zollmann's dis-
cussion of masses in his AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES 177-80.
83 143 Wis. at 103, 126 N.W. at 677.
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Judge Kerwin's majority opinion was filed on April 26, 1910. On
May 24, Judge Timlin filed a dissenting opinion in which he raised
an interesting question on the basis of Article I, section 18 of the
Wisconsin Constitution-the religious liberty provision. He doubted
whether, under this provision, the state through its courts or legislature
could "compel, direct, or regulate" the celebration of masses. And
Judge Timlin continued:
"Could the attorney general on relation of any of the bene-
ficiaries of this trust, or on his own motion, maintain an action
to compel or direct the saying of these masses? I think not. If he
could not, the charitable trust, if one is created, is invalid, be-
cause a charitable trust that cannot be enforced is not valid." 4
The constitution, Judge Timlin observed, prohibits any control or inter-
ference with the right of conscience.
"It is manifestly no answer to this to say that there is no likeli-
hood that the masses will be refused nor no likelihood that they
will be celebrated outside of this state whereby the people of this
state will have no benefit from the charity. The question is: Can
the state regulate the saying of such masses in this state? If the
state can enforce the saying of masses for the spiritual benefit of
non-Catholics, who are, according to the majority opinion, with
Catholics, the beneficiaries of this charitable trust, the trust is
valid; if not, it is invalid."6' 5
On June 10, Judge Marshall filed an extraordinary concurring
opinion, to Judge Kerwin's original opinion, in an attempt to answer
Judge Timlin's dissenting idea that "the constitutional right of im-
munity from interference in religious matters, stands in the way of
public enforcement of a trust of the character created."
"The answer to that is that no public enforcement would ever
in any event be required, except as to contractual features. The
constitution does not exempt religious orders or ministers of the
gospel from their obligations of contract. In that field they are
amenable to the law of the land the same as individuals in any
other field. If one should devise his property to a minister of
the gospel or a church society to build a church edifice and the
devisee should accept the trust, could such donee be heard
successfully to claim immunity from legal coercion to carry out
the agreement? That simple proposition, it would seem, shows
clearly that if the donee of a trust for masses accepts the offer
he thereby makes a promise subject to enforcement like any other
promise. He could not for a moment in any court be heard to
say, I will not keep my agreement and am entitled to protection
in my breach under my constitutional immunity from interfer-
ence in religious matters. The attorney general in proceeding
8 143 Wis. at 105, 126 N.W. at 679.
85 143 Wis. at 106, 126 N.W. at 679.
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to enforce such a trust is merely asserting the inviolability of a
public trust."8
The Kavanaugh case illustrates that Wisconsin's policy toward
bequests in trust to religious institutions had come a long way since the
early period when religious charities suffered by the state's refusal to
accept the doctrine of charitable uses.
The year 1917 saw the legislature enacting into law what the
supreme court apparently had already declared to be law. It is to be
remembered that the statute dealing with uses and trusts abolished all
uses and trusts "except as authorized and modified by this chapter. '87
This provision is still law in Wisconsin.8 But the legislature in 1917
inserted an exception by providing:
"No trust for charitable or public purposes, whether in real or
personal property, shall be invalid for indefiniteness or uncer-
tainty where power to designate the particular charitable or
public purpose or purposes to be promoted thereby is given by
the instrument creating the same to trustees, or to any other
person or persons."89
The doctrine of Harrington v. Pier continued to be followed in
the case of In re Keenan,90 where the Court upheld gifts for the benefit
of such "indigent sick persons residing in the city of Milwaukee as my
said trustees in their wise discretion shall deem worthy of such aid and
assistance." The law would have seemed to have been well settled by
this time in view of the consistency with which the Court had followed
the doctrine of Harrington v. Pier and the legislative action of 1917.
But the situation was not yet stable.
Strangely enough, the Court appears to have reverted to its former
position in Tharp v. Smith,91 when it held invalid a bequest in trust for
the benefit of the "Seventh Day Adventist Church." The bequest was
declared to be used principally for the publication and distribution of
tracts and literature, that teach the doctrine of the Church, to be paid
to the "proper trustees" of the Church. The Court held it void for
indefiniteness for the reasons, among others, that (1) it failed to desig-
86 143 Wis. at 111, 126 N.W. at 679-80.87 Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 57 (1849).
ss \Vis. STAT. sec. 231.01 (1951), formerly: Wis. STAT. sec. 2081 (1898).
89 Wis. Laws ch. 170 (1917), now: Wis. STAT. sec. 231.11 (7) (a) (1951). In ref-
erence to adoption of this provision, Carl Zollmann declared his reservaion, as
follows: "The inclusion of this specific exception in this statute instead of ex-
cepting generally all charitable trusts is certainly not particularly fortunate as
it might be construed as indicating a legislative construction according to which
the general subject of charitable trusts would be included in the statute."
Development of the Charity Doctrine in Wisconsin, I Wis. L. REv. 129, 139 n.
44 (1921).
90 171 Wis. 94, 176 N.W. 857 (1920). See also, Giblin v. Giblin, 173 Wis. 632, 182
N.W. 357 (1921).91182 Wis. 107, 195 N.W. 331 (1923).
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nate which of the various organizations of the Church should receive
the bequest; (2) no such local church existed; (3) the testator was not
a member or attendant at any such church; and (4) the cy pres doctrine
does not obtain in the state.
Even more confusing than the decision, itself, is the fact that the
Court cited in support of its decision several incompatible cases, among
which were Will of Fuller and Harrington v. Pier. The latter case took
the opposite view and expressly disapproved the former case, a point
emphasized by Carl Zollmann's criticism of the Tharp v. Smith de-
cision.
92
Carl Zollmann, writing in the Marquette Law Review, offered the
following comment:
"The court in Tharp v. Smith very clearly overlooks the patent
fact that a certain amount of discretion is inherently vested in
every trustee and even confuses this discretion with the Cy Pres
doctrine which is declared not to be in force in this state. It
gathers to its breast an old error which Marshall had exposed
clearly in his opinions and revitalizes it. It is to be hoped that the
legislature will soon take action to correct the error thus pro-
pounded by the court. 9
3
It may be added to Zollmann's cogent criticism that the reasoning in
Tharp v. Smith appears all the more confusing in view of the legisla-
ture's action of 1917.
Zollmann's expressed hope that the Wisconsin legislature would take
further action was not realized until 1933 when that body inserted
additional exceptions to the statute of uses and trusts, as follow:
"No trust or other gift for charitable or public purposes
whether in real or personal property shall be invalid because of
failure by the donor to indicate the method by which the purpose
of the trust or gift is to be accomplished.
"In the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the con-
trary, no trust or other gift for charitable or public purposes
whether in real or personal property shall be invalid because the
specific method provided by the donor for the accomplishment
of the general purpose indicated by him is or becomes for any
reason impracticable, impossible or unlawful.
"Where the fulfillment of the special purpose expressed in a
trust or other gift for charitable or public purposes is or becomes
impracticable, impossible or unlawful, it shall be the duty of the
courts by a liberal construction of the trust or gift to ascertain
92 Although Carl Zollmann, in discussing this point, erroneously stated that Heiss
v. Murphey, also cited, as well as Wil of Fuller, was overruled by Harrington
v. Pier, he voiced his consternation, as follows: "Just what induced the court
to do this is beyond the author's knowledge ... Nothing certainly is gained by
citing a case which negatives a proposition in affirmance of it." Cross Currents
in the Wisconsin Charity Doctrine, 8 MARQ. L. REV. 168, 172 (1924).
93 Id. at 172-3. See: Zollmann, Judge Roujet D. Marshall and the Wisconsin
Charity Doctrine, 10 MARQ. L. REv. 177 (1926).
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the general purpose of the donor and to carry it into effect in the
nearest practicable manner to the expressed special purpose;
provided, however, that the right of visitation of a living donor
shall not be held to be impaired by anything contained in this
subsection." 94
"These amendments ... did little more than declare existing law," Chief
Justice Rosenberry stated in 1937.9- Observing that it was unnecessary,
therefore, to rely upon the statute, the distinguished jurist, for the
Court, cited the authority of the general principles of Harrington v.
Pier:
"This court has decided, disregarding the reasons which
some others have deemed controlling, that there are inherent in
our courts all the strictly judicial powers ever exercised by the
chancellor on the High Court of Chancery of England to find
means to carry into effect a charitable purpose entertained by a
testator or grantor; that such courts lack only the prerogative
cy pres power enjoyed by the sovereign ...
"As pointed out in Harrington v. Pier . . . in some of the
earlier cases the cy pres doctrine was repudiated. It is quite clear
that what was repudiated was the prerogative power exercised by
the chancellor, not as a judge, but as a representative of the
Crown." 96
The temporary defection of the Court in Tharp v. Smith appeared
to be redressed completely in Rowell's Estate97 when the Court upheld
a bequest, as a valid trust, to the "Salvation Army of Appleton," with
the provision that the money "be expended by the Salvation Army for
the benefit of the needy people in the city of Appleton." The Court
reasoned that this created a bequest and trust to the advisory committee
of the Salvation Army in Appleton, and although this local body was
unincorporated and was not competent to act as a trustee, the trust could
not be held void for that reason. The Court ruled that it may appoint a
trustee to carry out the trust.
04 Wis. Laws ch. 413 (1933), now Wis. STAT. sec. 231.11 (7) (b), (c), and (d)
(1951).
95 First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Board of Trustees, 225 Wis. 34, 42, 272 N.W.
464, 468 (1937).
96 225 Wis. at 42-3, 272 N.W. at 468; quoting, in part, from the majority opinion
in Kronshage v. Varell, 120 Wis. 161, 164, 97 N.W. 928, 928-9 (1904). See also:
Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 2-49 Wis. 476, 24 N.W.,2d 893 (1946) ; Thron-
son's Estate, 243 Wis. 73, 9 N.W. 2d 641 (1943) ; Estate of Mead, 227 Wis. 311,
277 N.W. 694 (1938) ; Maxey v. Oshkosh, 144 Wis. 238, 128 N.W. 899 (1910) ;
distinguish, Nelson v. Madison Lutheran Hospital & Sanatorium, 237 Wis. 51S,
297 N.W. 424 (1941) where the Court, through Judge Wickhem, said of the
cy pres doctrine: "So far as this doctrine is recognized in Wisconsin, it is
simply a doctrine of liberal construction. It applies only where a general
charitable purpose can be found in the terms of a bequest or gift, and the
specific purpose of the bequest or gift has become impracticable or impossible."
And he added: "A mere casual reading of the section [WIs. STAT. sec. 231.11
(7)] discloses that its operation is dependent upon discovery of a general
charitable purpose." 237 Wis. at 525, 527, 297 N.W. at 426, 427.
97 28 Wis. 520, 22 N.W. 2d 604 (1945).
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Summary
Bequests and devises in trust to religious institutions are classified as
charitable trusts. The question of the definiteness necessary in charit-
able trusts "is not an inviting one to the superficial investigator ... A
'wilderness of cases' exists . . . which repels all but the most persistent
inquirer." Wisconsin's experience reflects the truth in the statement
that there is "no subject concerning which there is a greater diversity
of decisions .. ."98
The Wisconsin supreme court, by salvaging part of the cy pres
doctrine, has changed from a position of not recognizing the doctrine of
charitable uses as enumerated in the Statute of Elizabeth to one of
giving effect to that doctrine. It has changed from a position of narrow
construction of charitable bequests and trusts to one of liberal con-
struction by implementing the basic elements of the cy pres doctrine.
The legislature has reflected these changes. The intent of the grantor
is now held to control the whole bequest, and the court will do all that is
within its judicial power to give it effect.
Charitable trusts are public trusts and do not require the definiteness
necessary to create a private trust. In fact, indefiniteness of beneficiaries
and method of carrying out the trust are necessary elements of a valid
charitable bequest. If a religious bequest creates a trust which lacks an
ascertainable trustee, the court will appoint one. Thus, a bequest will
not fail for the reason that it is made in trust to an unincorporated
religious society.
Real property, as well as personalty, given to a religious society may
create an enforceable charitable trust. And the doctrine of perpetuities
does not impair such a trust. The court will give full effect to the intent
of a grantor as against any diversion of the trust.
Bequests for the saying of masses are no longer held to create
private trusts, but rather they create valid public trusts to be enforced
as any charitable trust. It is the Wisconsin judicial opinion that such
bequests are for the promotion of a particular faith and for the benefit
of the public generally, as well as individuals. A bequest made in sup-
port of a particular faith or mode of vorship does not interfere with
any constitutional right of conscience, impose a religious test, or con-
travene public policy.
Separation of Church and State no longer means in Wisconsin, if it
ever did, that the State will pursue a policy inimical to the welfare of
religious institutions. Although the state of Wisconsin, itself, may not
make contributions for religious purposes, it will now safeguard and
enforce the right of religious institutions to receive bequests in trust, as
98 ZOLLMANNI, AMERICAN LAW OF CHAREs 221 (1924).
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a contractual right, by applying the rules of liberal interpretation and
giving effect to the doctrine of charitable uses.
TAXATION EXEMPTION
Still another major statutory right of religious institutions in Wis-
consin is that concerning taxation exemption of religious property.
Insofar as the principle of separation of Church and State cc.nprehends
a certain immunity of religious institutions from the force of law, then
separation of this character is reflected in the immunity of each religious
institution from taxation of a portion of its property. But this is
statutory, not constitutional, separation. The Wisconsin Constitution
provides only that the rule of taxation shall be uniform, and taxes shall
be levied on such property as the legislature shall prescribe. 99 Thus,
Wisconsin is one of only sixteen states that does not have a specific
constitutional reference to the exemption from taxation of property
used for religious purposes.100
Establishing Basic Policy
Whether specific exemption should be made a constitutional pro-
vision was thoroughly considered by the framers of the present con-
stitution. On December 24, 1847, after the voters had rejected the
original constitution,10' Mr. Richardson, a delegate, successfully intro-
duced a resolution in the second convention which provided:
"That the committee on general provisions be instructed to
inquire into the expediency of incorporating a clause in the
constitution, exempting from taxation the property of the state
and counties, both real and personal, and all such property set
apart either by virtue of law or by private donation or be-
queathment, for religious, school, and charitable purposes."' 0' 2
On December 30, 1847, the committee reported back to the convention
its original draft of the article on "Finance":
99 Wis CONST. Art. VIII, sec. 1. It now reads, as amended Nov. 1908, April 1927,
and April 1941: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the legislature may
empower cities, villages or towns to collect and return taxes on real estate
located therein by optional methods. Taxes shall be levied upon such property
with such classifications as to forests and minerals including or separate or
severed from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe. Taxes may also be
imposed on incomes, privileges and occupations, which taxes may be graduated
and progressive, and reasonable exemptions may be provided." See: Bixby,
Note: Wis. CoNsT. Art. VIII, Sec. 1-Partial Exemption of Value As An In-
ducenment to Proper Subdisision, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 141, 142-3; and for history
of the adoption of the tax provision, see Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin
Constitution, 1952 Wis. L. REV. 23, 45-6.
100 ToRPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 174 (1948).
"In each case, however, there is legislative authorization or implied power to
exempt property from taxation by general law." Ibid.
101 See, JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO FORM A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF
WISCONSIN 19 (Madison, 1848) for an abstract of the votes rejecting the first
constitution.102 Id. at 69. "It was decided in the affirmative," on Dec. 27. Id. at 85.
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"The property of the state and counties, both real and
personal, and such property as the legislature shall deem proper,
belonging to educational, charitable, or religious institutions, or
set apart for such purposes, shall be exempted from taxation."'0 3
The article finally came up for consideration on January 5, 1848,
when Delegate Lovell spoke against exemption. According to the
record of the convention:
"He hoped no specific exemption would be adopted. If such a
provision were incorporated in the constitution, it would cut off
the action of the legislature on the subject, and it would be left to
the worst kind of legislation in the world-judicial legislation.
The manner in which a fixed system of exemption from taxation
would operate, might be very oppressive. A block of buildings
might be erected in Milwaukee, the lower stories of which might
consist of stores, while the whole upper part might be devoted to
a church. Under the proposed provision, the entire building
would be exempted from taxation. The only proper course was
to leave the settlement of the question to the legislature...104
The very next year, in 1849, the new state legislature provided that
exemption from property taxation shall include "all houses of public
worship, and the lots on which they are situated, and the pews or slips
and furniture therein, every parsonage, and all burial grounds, tomgs
and rights of burial." Apparently recalling Mr. Lovell's cogent criti-
cism, it was added:
". .. but any part of any building, being a house of public
worship, which shall be kept or used as a store or shop, or for
any other purpose except for public worship or for schools,
shall be taxed upon the cash valuation thereof, the same as
personal property, to the owner or occupant, or to both; and the
taxes thereon shall be collected in the same manner as taxes on
personal estate. '10 5
As if to be doubly certain that religious property would be exempted,
the 1849 legislature provided separately that:
"Every church, parsonage, and school house belonging to
any religious society, with land belonging thereto, not to exceed
in all three acres in any one town, village or township, or if in a
city, not to exceed one lot for each of said buildings, shall not be
103 Id. at 113.
104 JOURNAL, op. cit. supra note 101, at 206. Mr. Judd, a delegate, twice had pro-
posed amendments, both of which read: "The property of the state, property
of any common school, university, college or seminary of learning, all houses
erected for and dedicated to the public worship of God, and the lots which
they necessarily occupy for such purpose, and all public burying grounds and
such other property as the legislature shall prescribe by law shall be free from
taxation." Id. at 203. But the amendments failed adoption in both instances.
Id. at 203, 206.
105 Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 19, sec. 5 (1849).
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subject to taxation for any purpose except for its own improve-
ment." 0 6
Thus did the legislature act when the convention refused to act. And it
is to be noted that the latter provision established a policy that has
persisted to the present, that of area limitation.
Movement for Repeal
The years 1873-1880 witnessed the only movement, of a concen-
trated character, to effect repeal of the Wisconsin statutes exempting
religious property from taxation, and an equal effort to thwart such an
event. The legislature, in 1873, received a number of memorials, peti-
tions, and remonstrances concerning property exemption. While a large
number of people seemed to favor a "sweeping repeal of all exemp-
.tions," except as to public property, "an equally respectable number"
insisted "that the laws exempting religious, scientific, literary, and
benevolent associations from the burden of taxation, are just and dic-
tated by the highest considerations of policy and morals."'1 "
Among the latter was William E. Armitage, bishop of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in Wisconsin, who submitted a memorial on Febru-
ary 6, 1873 to the Assembly, which read, in part:
"The ground on which church property has hitherto been
exempted from taxation.., is a very strong one. ... Churches,
religious institutions, houses of worship, producing no revenues
to their occupants like other property, are producers of good
morals, good citizenship, domestic and social virtues, habits of
integrity and restraint, which are of the utmost value to the state
and to every separate community in it. And the state is no loser
in giving to bodies of men who, out of their own means, establish
and maintain such centres of moral health, and life, the recogni-
tion of not taxing the houses they build for them, as it taxes their
own dwellings and shops and stores."108
106 Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 47, sec. 24 (1849), which incorporated policy established
by the territorial legislature in 1839. Wis. Laws of 1839, p. 136.
107 Report of the Select Senate Committee on the Law Exempting Property from
Taxation, SENATE JOURNAL 292-3 (1873). "It also appeared from memorials
... that several religious and cemetary societies, while themselves exempt, join
in the prayer to tax all property alike, for the reason that the present system
in its practical operation is open to much abuse, and production of more harm
than good." Ibid. On the national level, "the most important utterance by a
representative public officer raising the question of possible changes in policy
in this matter was by President Grant... , in his seventh message to Con-
gress. 'I would suggest,' he said, 'the taxation of all property equally, whether
church or corporation, exempting only the last resting place of the dead, and
possibly, with proper restrictions, church edifices.'" 3 STOKES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 421 (New York, 1950). For a brief discussion
of Wisconsin newspapers' support of repeal of exemption of church property,
in 1880 on the ground of religious freedom, see PHELAN, THE FINANCIAL
HISTORY OF WISCONSIN 221-2 (Madison, 1906).
108 Memorial from the Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church on Church
Taxation, ASSEMBLY JoURNAL 262 (1873).
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Repeal of exemption would seriously impair "the establishment of re-
ligion and its instrumentalities." And the bishop added:
"Our congregations are generally poor, and few of them have
rich men in them .... And that is a rare church building which
does not represent an amount of struggle and effort... which
deserves to be recognized and helped, as in themselves benefiting
the community before the direct benefits of the work begin to tell.
"Now come to one of these struggling little flocks-and there
S.. say to them, although you are spending here and getting no
money returns, although you are giving for the general and
permanent good of the community, you must pay taxes on what
you build, just as if this were a store or a mill-and you will cast
on them a load difficult, and sometimes impossible for them to
bear. If they pay it, it will be out of the minister's pittance, or in
some way out of their very life as a corporation.' ' 9
In view of the conflicting opinions and the absence of reliable
-,tatistics, a Senate committee that studied the problem found itself in a
".most embarrassing" position. But it estimated that all exempt prop-
vrty of charitable associations in the state approximated $9,000,000,
one-half of which was church property, which was termed as of "trifling
bearing" when it is considered that the aggregate value of taxable prop-
'.rty was $702,000,000 according to the 1870 census."10
Still, the committee was cognizant of certain considerations among
which was the fact that too often the charitable character of such asso-
ciations is "a mere pretense and cover" to avoid the burden of taxation.
"Doubts of a very grave nature exist," moreover, "whether the exemp-
tion of church property is not a compulsory mode of taxing others for
the support of places of worship, or equivalent to drawing money from
the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, and in violation of
section 18, article 1 of our constitution." ' Among its recommenda-
Tions, the committe submitted the following statement:
"That the laws exempting the property of . . . religious, sci-
,!ntific, literary or benevolent associations, be amended so that in
clear and unambiguous language, they shall provide for the tax-
ation in the ordinary mode, of all property belonging to such...
societies, which is not necessary and exclusively used for their
immediate and legitimate purposes.""112
But this recommendation apparently did not satisfy those legisla-
tors who wanted repeal of all exemptions, for another Senate commit-
tee, two days later, issued the statement that: "The theory of taxation
is that all property should pay its just proportion of the taxes; any sys-
109 Id. at 263-4.
110 Report, op. cit. supra note 107, at 293-4.
"' Report, op. cit. supra note 107, at 294.
112 Report, op. cit. supra note 107, at 295.
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tern of law which operates differently is pernicious, and becomes de-
structive of the ends of government." 1 13
All bills introduced in 1873 to change the exemption provisions
failed of passage. In 1874, a bill providing repeal of all exemptions was
introduced in the Assembly, but the committee to which it was referred
recommended that it be indefinitely postponed.114 Assemblyman Charles
H. Larkin appeared in opposition to the bill, and the committee included
in its report his lengthy argument. Some of his remarks were made in
answer to the "chief argument brought forward by those who insist on
taxing" religious institutions, "that their exemption is contrary to"
Article I, section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution. This provision does
not contemplate taxation of religious property, said Larkin. "The ob-
vious intention was to have the state pursue a 'let alone' policy toward
these institutions, so far as taxation is concerned.""115
"Now if the state tax the edifices which men erect for the wor-
ship of God, and if, it may be, sell these edifices for the nonpay-
ment of taxes, it appears to me, that it thereby interferes with
the right of worship which the constitution says shall never be
infringed.""11
And he added: "If the people of Wisconsin were to proceed to tax out
of existence half the churches established in their midst for the worship
of God, I think such a course would be arrant hypocrisy." Such taxes,
he concluded, "at best are of doubtful constitutionality, and are cer-
tainly antagonistic to the public good.""17
The advocates of repeal were not victorious. The 1878 revision of
the statutes did not change the exclusive use and area limitations adopt-
ed in 1868. And the wording as stated in 1878 has continued in sub-
stantially identical form to the present time. The 1878 provision
exempted:
"Personal property owned by any religious, scientific, literary
or benevolent association, used exclusively for the purposes of
such association, and the real property, if not leased, or not other-
wise used for pecuniary profit necessary for the location and
convenience of the buildings of such association and embracing
the same, not exceeding ten acres; ... and parsonages, whether
of local churches or districts, and whether occupied by the pas-
tor permanently, or rented for his benefit. The occasional leasing
21 Report of the Select Senate Committee on Bill No. 44S, SENATE JOURNAL 334
(1873).114 Report of the Committee on Assessment and Collection of Taxes on No. 282A,
ASSEMBLY JOURNAL 379 (1874).115 Id. at 381.
126 Ibid.
17 Id. at 384, 385. Larkin cited the preamble to the Wisconsin Constitution: "We,
the people of Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty God. ... ."-and added that if
the people continued tax exemption of religious property, they "would ... be
showing their gratitude to Almighty God in a very singular way." Id. at 384.
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of such buildings for schools, public lectures or concerts, or the
leasing of such parsonages, shall not render them liable to taxa-
tion."118
Advocates of repeal persisted in one final attempt. They submitted
several memorials to the Senate, in 1880, asking for taxation of church
property. After studying the question, the Senate Committee on Char-
itable and Penal Institutions recommended indefinite postponement.
"The framers of our constitution," said the Committee, "wisely sep-
arated it [the church] from the state, and while making provision for
the latter, left the church to be supported by the voluntary offerings of
the people." 1 9
"Our fathers refused to tax the people for the support of the
church, but left religion free as air and water; and it is now pro-
posed that we should tax the church to support the people; to lay
an embargo on men's consciences, and restore the temple to the
money changers."' 12 0
And the Committee concluded:
"When our churches become so crowded that the pews are sold
at a premium high enough to pay the mortgages on the lots and
put money into the pockets of the bloated vestrymen, it will be
time enough to make them contribute to the relief of our banks,
insurance companies, and other needy institutions.' 20
Strict Construction
What may be said concerning taxation exemption in general is ap-
plicable specifically to property of religious institutions. The Wisconsin
judiciary has favored a strict construction of the exemption privilege.
Although there is no doubt that the legislature may prescribe what
property shall be taxed,122 which implies the legislative power to pre-
scribe exemptions from both general property taxation 23 and special
assessments,'24 taxation is the rule and exemption the exception. 25
"lsWis. REv. STAT. sec. 1038 (3) (1878) ; now Wis. Stat. sec. 70.11 (4) (1951).
The 1878 provision was composed of several acts, but chiefly that created by
Wis. Laws ch. 130, sec. 2 (186S). Minor changes appeared in Wis. Laws ch.
164 (3) (1869) and ch. 125 (1870).
119 Report of the Senate Committee on Charitable and Penal Institutions on
Menorials Asking for the Taxation of Church Property, SENATE JouRaNAL 287,
288 (1880).
120 Ibid.
.21 Id. at 291.
122 Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 15 Wis. 600 (1862) ; State ex rel.
Att'y Gen. v. Winnebago Lake & Fox River Plankroad Co., 11 Wis. 35 (1860);
Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410 (1859).
123 Board of Trustees of Lawrence University v. Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244,
136 N.W. 619 (1912) ; Wisconsin Cent. R. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis. 37,
8 N.W. 833 (1881).
124 Lamasco Realty Co. v. Milwaukee, 242 Wis. 357, 8 N.W. 2d 372, 8 N.W. 2d
865 (1943).
125 Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Shawano County, 256 Wis. 196, 40 N.W. 2d
590 (1949) ; Legion Clubhouse, Inc. v. City of Madison, 248 Wis. 380, 21 N.W.
2d 668 (1945).
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Hence, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has followed the well estab-
lished rule that statutes exempting property from taxation are to be
strictly construed, and all doubts in respect to specified property are to
be resolved in favor of its taxability. 12 For such exemption to be valid,
therefore, it must be clear and express. All presumption are against it,
and those claiming exemption must bring themselves clearly within the
express terms of the statute. Thus, exemption is not to exist by impli-
cations.
12 7
In reference specifically to taxation exemption of religious property,
the basic statutory requisites for exemption have remained unchanged
since 1868. These are presently, as they were in 1868: (1) religious
ownership, (2) exclusive religious use, (3) 10 acres maximum, and
(4) necessary land.1 28
Examination of two cases-one holding religious property to be
taxable, and the other upholding exemption-may illustrate the general
limits set by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's construction of the statu-
tory right of taxation exemption of religious property.
In 1886, the Congregational Church of Appleton was located on
several lots, but one lot owned by the church was vacant, unoccupied,
and some distance from the church buildings. Whether the vacant lot
was taxable was the issue in Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v.
Outagamie County. 129 The Supreme Court held that doubtlessly the
lot was taxable. Speaking for the Court, Judge Orton said:
"That church might as well have claimed that lot exempt if it
had been located in another city, and it could as well have claimed
1*- Northern Supply Co. v. Milwaukee, 256 Wis. 509, 30 N.W. 2d 379 (1949);
Fi-st Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 248 Wis. 21, 20
N.W. 2d 647 (1945); Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 236 Wis. 631, 296 N.W. 58 (1941); Armory Realty Co. v. Olsen,
210 Wis. 281, 246 N.W. 513 (1933) ; United States Nat. Bank v. Poor Hand-
maids of Jesus Christ, 148 Wis. 613, 135 N.W. 121 (1912) ; Katzer v. City of
Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N.W. 745 (1899); State ex rel. Milwaukee St. Ry.
Co. v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550, 63 N.W. 746 (1895), overruled on another point
in State ex rel. Badger Illuminating Co. v. Anderson, 97 Wis. 114, 72 N.W. 386
(1897) ; State ex rel. Bell v. Harshaw, 76 Wis. 230, 45 N.W. 308 (1890)
Weston v. Supervisors of Shawano County, 44 Wis. 242 (1878).
127 State ex rel. Wisconsin Compensation Rating & Inspection Bureau v. City of
Milwaukee, 249 V/is. 71, 23 N.W. 2d 501 (1946) ; Comet Co. v. Dept. of Taxa-
tion. 243 Wis. 117, 9 N.W. 2d 620 (1943) ; Bowman Dairy Co. v. Tax Com-
mission, 240 Wis. 1, 1 N.W. 2d 905 (1942) ; Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215
Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113 (1934) ; Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co. v. Tax Commis-
sion, 207 Wis. 546, 242 N.W. 321 (1932) ; Methodist Episcopal Church Baraca
Club v. City of Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N.W. 258 (1918); distinguish:
Aberg v. Moe, 198 Wis. 349, 224 N.W. 132, 226 N.W. 301 (1929) ; State ex rel.
Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Leech, 156 Wis. 121, 144 N.W. 290 (1914). Property
not subject to taxation cannot be assessed for taxation. 14 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y
GEN. 159 (1925).
128 NVis. STAT. sec. 70.11 (4) (1951), revised and recreated by Wis. Laws ch. 63,
634, 643 (1949). "Leasing such property to similar organizations for educa-
tional or benevolent purposes, where all the income derived therefrom is used
for maintenance, shall not render the property taxable." Ibid.
129 76 Wis. 587, 45 N.W. 536 (1890).
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any number of vacant lots scattered about the city or out of it...
to be exempt from taxation. Such a construction of the statute
would exempt all the real property of any such religious asso-
ciation, however or wherever situated, .. . and however distant.
... The statute is clear and explicit, and affords no chance for
such a loose and liberal construction."' 30
The statute requires that real property as well as personal property be
used exclusively for the purposes of the religious institution. It is not
used for church purposes here, nor is the lot necessary for the location
and convenience of the buildings. And Judge Orton concluded: "This
lot was valued at $5,000. This is too important an omission of taxable
property to be overlooked."'13
That the exclusive use limitation is a rule of reason, not to be ap-
plied indscriminately, was the doctrine of Northwestern Publishing
House v. Milwaukee.13 2 The Northwestern Publishing House was en-
gaged in the business of publishing and selling books, periodicals, and
other literature "considered beneficial to the Evangelical Lutheran
faith." All profits were turned over to the Evangelical Lutheran Synod
of Wisconsin. The only real estate owned by the House was one lot, of
less than one acre, in Milwaukee, on which was located the printing
plant. Taxes levied on this property were paid under protest.
Judge Rosenberry, for the Court, did not find it necessary to de-
termine whether or not the Publishing House and Synod were religious
corporations, for it was clear that they were organized for educational
and benevolent purposes, he reasoned, and so were within the express
terms of the exemption statute.
"The importance to a sectarian body of controlling and man-
aging the publication and distribution of the literature inculcat-
ing its doctrines is well understood. Instilling into the minds of
the young, stimulating and deepening the convictions of the ma-
ture in matters relating to the faith and doctrine of the Lutheran
Church by the publication and distribution of printed matter, are
certainly educational purposes within the meaning of [the
statute] .)"133
Only a very small part of one percent of the Publishing House's income
is derived from printing letterheads and envelopes for the convenience
of its patrons, and to give continuous employment to its workmen. Also,
about 20 square feet of floor space is taken up by a display of a sample
church bench, school seat, and some baptismal fonts, for which the
House takes orders. Despite these facts, said judge Rosenberry, the
departure from the exclusive use requirement "is so slight as to be
130 76 Wis. at 590-91, 45 N.W. at 537.
13 76 Wis. at 592, 45 N.W. at 538.
132 177 Wis. 401, 188 N.W. 636 (1922).
133 177 Wis. at 408, 188 N.W. at 638.
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negligible and therefore to be disregarded." The departure is not suf-
ficient "to warrant us in saying that the property is not used exclusively
for educational and benevolent purposes."'134
Although the property in both cases was of a religious character,
the church lot in the first case was not used for exclusive religious pur-
poses, while the property in the Publishng House case, if not used ex-
clusively for religious purposes, was used nevertheless for exclusive
educational and benevolent purposes. The important point is that the
latter property was exempt under the statute despite the fact that a small
part of it was devoted to other than educational and benevolent purposes.
Thus, the exclusive use requirement is applied by the courts as a rule
of reason. It is a requirement that should not unreasonably impair the
statutory right of exemption of institutions of a religious or charitable
character. All presumptions must remain, however, in favor of taxa-
bility and against exemption.
Parsonages
Strict construction of the exemption statute is no more in evidence
than in the law concerning parsonages, 13' although this is not reflected
in the earliest case on the subject: Gray v. La Fayette County.136 Gray
owned three contiguous lots-a yard, garden, and a house-and, ex-
pecting exemption, he leased them to the Baptist Church for less rent
than he could obtain otherwise, to be used as a parsonage. Concerning
taxability, the Supreme Court held that the property must be considered
a parsonage since it was rented for a pastor, and thus came within the
statutory exemption of parsonages "whether occupied by the pastor
permanently or rented for his benefit."' 37 The case turned on the mean-
ing of the word "rented" which the Court liberally construed. The
Court was;
"... impelled to the conclusion that the more reasonable con-
struction of the statute is that the word "rented," .... applies to
parsonages rented by church associations as lessees .... It fol-
lows that the property described in the complaint, when the same
was assessed for taxation in 1883, was the parsonage of the
Baptist Church Association, rented by it for its pastor (who oc-
cupied it), and was therefore exempt from taxation in that
year."' 38
134 177 Wis. at 409, 188 N.W. at 639.
15 The law concerning taxation exemption of cemeteries is related, although
treated separately. See, for instance: 14 Ops. Wis. AT-r'Y GEN. 165 (1925), 13
Ops. Wis ATT'Y GEN. 43 (1924), and Wis. STAT. sec. 70.11 (13) (1951).
136 65 Wis. 567, 27 N.W. 311 (1886).
37 Wls. REv. STAT. sec. 1038 (3) (1878).
138 65 Wis. at 571, 27 N.W. at 312. "We do not regard the case as very importantin its results. The amount of property affected by it is probably not large,
and if the legislature should think . that the exemption established by ourjudgment is against public policy, it can easily apply the remedy." 65 Wis. at
572, 27 N.W. at 313.
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It is difficult to reconcile the Gray decision with later authority, espe-
cially with the leading case of Katzer v. City of Milwaukee"39 which,
although distinguishable in its facts, followed a different line of reason-
ing. In 1892, the Catholic Church diocese of Milwaukee purchased
property in Milwaukee as a residence for Katzer, archbishop of the
diocese, and the title of ownership was conveyed to him. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court held the property to be taxable on the ground that
the real estate and parsonage were not owned by and used exclusively
for the purposes of the diocese as the statutory exemption requires. The
Court relied on the rule that all doubt must be resolved in favor of
taxability when the meaning of a tax exemption statute is ambiguous or
uncertain. "It is for the legislature to grant these special privileges,"
said Judge Dodge for the Court.
"The property in question is prima facie owned absolutely by an
individual. It is conveyed by warranty deed to the plaintiff, with
no intimation that such conveyance is due to his place or office.
.*. We are, however, urged to recognize the fact that, by what
is called. . . 'laws of the Roman Catholic Church,' he holds the
property upon some trust. What that trust is is not at all defined
in the evidence further than that he declares that he holds it in
trust for the diocese and to devise it by will to his successor....
Courts can recognize only rights which are regulated and estab-
lished by law. The obligation of one who holds for another must
rest upon and be enforceable by the law; and however strong
may be such obligations .. . they are of no force to establish
rights to ownership in any other than him who holds the legal
title."140
The Gray decision held that property owned by an individual and
rented to a church for a parsonage was exempt. The Katzer decision
held that property owned by a clergyman and used by him for his resi-
dence was not exempt. In the former case, the Court followed what it
termed a "reasonable construction" of the exemption statute, while in
the latter case, it employed the- doctrine of strict construction. Since
Gray, expecting exemption, charged the church less rent, the Gray de-
cision could be considered as favorable to religious institutions. The
Katzer decision was certainly unfavorable-especially to the Catholic
Church in which bishops and archbishops play singular roles as trustees
of each Roman Catholic corporation, a monarchical, or corporation sole,
type of religious organization.14 3
139 104 Wis. 16, 79 N.W. 745 (1899), rehearing denied, 104 Wis. 23, 80 N.W. 41(1899).
140 104 Wis. at 21-2, 79 N.W. at 746. "Courts have judicial knowledge of the
laws of the land, but not of the 'laws of the Catholic Church."' 104 Wis. at 23,
79 N.W. at 747.
141 Op. cit. supra note 13.
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The doctrine of strict construction was followed in 1916 in an
opinion of the Attorney General. James Aran had bequeathed $20,000
to the Wisconsin Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church for
the purchase of land and the erection thereon of a suitable home for
superannuated Methodist ministers. After three cottages were com-
pleted, the Conference found that no ministers desired to come and
occupy them. So they were rented to various tenants and all money
from the rent was used exclusively "for the support of superannuated
ministers living elsewhere." The Attorney General stated that the cot-
tages could not be regarded as tax exempt since they were not par-
sonages and were not occupied by a clergyman.1 42
Along the same line, the Attorney General decided, in 1924, that a
parsonage owned by ministers was not exempt, being squarely ruled by
the Katzer decision. 143 Doubt was likewise resolved against exemption
when the Attorney General decided that a dwelling rented by a religious
organization for the use of a parish school teacher, who assisted a pastor
and in his absence performed some of his duties, is not exempt from
taxation. 4 4 But the reasoning of the Gray case was revived by Attorney
General Loomis in 1938.'1' A large church employed two pastors. One
resided in a church-owned parsonage, while the other resided inca
church-rented parsonage. On the basis of the Gray decision, Attorney
General Loomis ruled both parsonages exempt from taxation. The
term "rented" in the exemption statute, he reasoned, does not refer to a
parsonage owned by the church and rented by it as lessor, but refers to
a parsonage rented by the church as lessee and used by a pastor. And
he added:
"Sec. 70.11, subsec. (4) does not limit the parsonage exemp-
tion to one parsonage for each church. The statute is broadly
worded to provide exemption for all parsonages so long as said
parsonages are either occupied by the pastor permanently or
rented by the church (as lessee) for the benefit of the pastor."'146
In 1940, District Attorney John H. Matheson addressed a query on
the subject to Attorney General Martin.14 7 The Salvation Army of
Janesville had leased for a year from an individual a residence for the
use of its commanding officer. Among his activities, the commanding
officer conducted regular religious services, performed marriage cere-
1424 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 460 (1915).
143 13 Ops. Wis. Arry GEN. 291 (1924).
144 13 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y GEN. 599 (1924). Distinguish, 27 Ors. Wis. ATr'Y GEN.
693 (1938) where the opinion was rendered that residences situated upon the
grounds of the Evangelical Lutheran Seminary of Mequon, Wisconsin, and
occupied rent free by instructors are exempt under sec. 70.11 (4), STATS.,
which applies to "any educational institution."
14527 Ops. Wis Arr'Y GEN. 430 (1938).
148 Id. at 431.
14729 Ops. Wis. Ai-FY GEN. 250 (1940).
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monies, and otherwise fulfilled the "functions of a minister or priest."
Although not ordained, he was "commissioned" by the Salvation Army
"after a course of schooling, including considerable theological train-
ing." The question was whether his residence would be exempt as a
parsonage. "Churches and other religious institutions," Attorney General
Martin replied, "enjoy no inherent exemption and their property is
taxable except so far as it is specifically exempted by constitutional or
statutory enactment."'148 Accordingly, since the Salvation Army com-
mander lacks ordination, he is not a pastor or parson and his residence,
therefore, cannot be exempted as a parsonage under the statute.
A similar question was posed to Attorney General Broadfoot in
1948.19 The Lutheran Wisconsin District of the Missouri Synod
Lutheran Church owned a house in Wausau which it devoted to the
Executive Secretary of Christian Education of the Synod for use as
his home. His duties were "to promote the religious and educational
work of the Synod." Since he was not ordained, and hence the prop-
erty could not be exempt under the statute, as a parsonage, the question
raised was whether it would be exempt as consisting of "real property
necessary for the location and convenience of the buildings of such
institution." The only purpose here for the religious organization in
owning the property, Attorney General Broadfoot replied, is "to supply
an employe with a personal dwelling," and not to use it for religious
activities. 150 In respect to the language exempting parsonages, he said:
"If premises furnished by a church organization to an officer or
employe were included in and accorded exemption by this gen-
eral language ... then by the same reasoning premises furnished
by a church to its minister or priest for a private home would
also be included therein and exempt. There would seem to be
more reason and basis for exemption in the case of a minister or
priest than in that of the officer or employe."' 51
Dominant Purpose Doctrine
Aside from the subject of property belonging to strictly religious
institutions, such as church buildings and parsonages, there is the matter
of property belonging to institutions that are only partly religious in
character and are otherwise charitable or benevolent. Some of these
possess funds.in excess of cost, and in this sense certain activities are
profitable. But to be exempt under the statute, their property may not
be leased or otherwise used for pecuniary profit.152 Prior to 1949, it
was declared that the statute required only the personal property of
'48Jd. at 251.
49 37 Ops. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 537 (1948).250 Id. at 539-40.
2- Id. at 540.
152 Formerly Wis. REv. STAT. sec. 1038 (3) (1878), now Wis. STAT sec. 70.11 (4)
(1951).
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such an association to be used exclusively for its purposes, and that this
was not required of its real property.153 But this distinction was erased
in 1949 by the deletion of the prefix "personal" at the beginning of the
exemption provision, so that now exempt is: "Property owned and used
exclusively . . . by churches or religioup, educational or benevolent
associations."'154
Clearly, an association must come within at least one the specified
classifications for its property to be exempt. Under the tax exemption
statute, Wisconsin has the "dominant purpose" rule. This means that
the dominant purpose of the institution, rather than incidental or col-
lateral lesser purposes, characterizes it.151
Thus, the Young Men's Christian Association of Appleton, which is
otherwise charitable or benevolent, does not lose such character be-
cause some income results from the operations conducted by it.-56 It is
"a nonprofit corporation, and its prime purpose is to build character
and better Christian citizenship from the developing material in its
community. That is truly a benevolent purpose. 1' 157 Accordingly,
Y.M.C.A. owned and operated camps for boys and young men are tax
free to ten acres total Y.M.C.A. property in each taxing district.158
153 5 OPs. Wis Ar'Y GEN. 716, 721 (1916).
154Wis. Laws ch. 63, 634 (1949).
155 Prairie du Chien Sanitarium Co. v. Prairie du Chien, 242 Wis. 262, 7 N.W. 2d
832 (1943) ; Order of the Sisters of St. Joseph v. Plover, 239 Wis. 278, 1 N.W.
2d 173 (1941) ; Rogers Memorial Sanitarium v. Summit, 228 Wis. 507, 279 N.W.
623 (1938); Will of Roberts, 193 Wis. 415, 214 N.W. 347 (1927); North-
western Publishing House v. Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 401, 188 N.W. 636 (1922);
St. John's Military Academy v. Edwards, 143 Wis. 551, 128 N.W. 113 (1910);
St. Joseph's Hospital Association v. Ashland County, 96 Wis. 636, 72 N.W. 43
(1897).
1565 OPs. Wis ATr'y GEN. 716, 717 (1916).
157 21 OPs. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 74, 76 (1932). "... it is a matter of common knowl-
edge that the social and entertainment activities of Y.M.C.A.'s that are not
directly religious, educational, or benevolent, are incidental to the dominant
purpose ... ." Ibid.
158 State ex rel. Association of Y.M.C.A. of Wisconsin v. Richardson, 197 Wis.
390, 222 N.W. 222 (1928). The 10 acres limitation does not mean that the
association only is allowed 10 acres tax free in the whole state, but rather it
means 10 acres tax free in each taxing district. "If an association were en-
titled to but a single exemption in the state, the statute provides no method by
which the taxing district in which the exemption is to be claimed shall be
determined." 197 Wis. at 393, 222 N.W. at 223. Land jointly owned by the
Methodist churches of Janesville and Beloit and used by them for a summer
playground is not exempt under sec. 70.11 (4), STATS., for the reason that the
land is not necessary for the location and convenience of the buildings of the
religious corporations involved. 20 OPs. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 282 (1931). A lot
on which no building stands is not exempt under the statute. 14 OPs. Wis.
ATT'Y GEN. 132 (1925). But property of a corporation formed for the purpose
of conducting a summer school and camp for boys where lectures, classes, and
religious services are held, and various forms of instruction are given in con-
nection with recreational activities, is an educational purpose within the ex-
emption section. 12 OPs. Wis. ATT'y GEN. 434 (1923). Likewise, property of
the Onoway Camping Association, having the purpose to maintain a camp for
physical, moral, and spiritual training of young people, and organized ex-
clusively for educational, benevolent, charitable, and reformatory purposes, is
exempt up to 10 acres, unless its property is used for pecuniary profit. 14 Ops.
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A Catholic woman's club, comprising a club-house in which rooms
were rented for meetings, and an auditorium rented to lodges and pri-
vate dancing parties, was declared exempt as a nonprofitable benevo-
lent, charitable, and educational institution. The incidental activities
amount to "occasional leasing" which is permitted by the statute, the
Supreme Court ruled.159
To the same effect was the decision in St. Joseph's Hospital v. Ash-
land County. 60 A hospital operated by a Catholic order of nuns, the
"Handmaids of Jesus Christ," received many charity patients without
distinction as to race, religion, or "position in life." Whatever profits
were derived were used for paying the building expenses, and some
was loaned without interest to aid the building of other hospitals belong-
ing to the same order in Superior and West Superior. For the Supreme
Court, Judge Winslow was grandiloquent:
"How can it be doubted that this institution is doing a benevo-
lent work in the truest sense of the word we are unable to see.
It is really the work of the good Samaritan.... The care of the
sick and wounded of all races and religions indiscriminately, with
or without pay, according to the ability of the patient, must ever
be one of the most genuine forms of benevolence. It breathes the
truest love for unfortunate mankind."'"'
A very similar case was Order of the Sisters of St. Joseph v. Plo-
ver.'62 The Town of Plover of Portage County levied a tax on the
River Pines Tuberculosis Sanatorium operated by Catholic nuns of the
Order of the Sisters of St. Joseph. Some of the profit was used for the
Wis. ATT'y GEN. 434 (1925). It is to be noted that the exemption statute now
provides specifically for exemption of lands not exceeding 40 acres of the
state Y.M.C.A. or Y.W.C.A. used "exclusively for summer training camps or
assemblies for moral, religious and educational purposes." Wis. STAT. sec.
70.11 (10) (1951). Also now exempted is "all real property not exceeding 30
acres and the personal property situated therein, of any Bible camp conducted
by a religious nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of this state, so
long as the property is used for religious purposes and not for pecuniary profit
of any individual." Wis. STAT. sec. 70.11 (11) (1951).
159 Catholic Woman's Club v. Green Bay, 180 Wis. 102, 104, 192 N.W. 479, 480(1923). "Each case depends upon its particular facts .... The corporation
must not only be judged by its declared objects but also by what it actually
does." "To deny that the respondents come within the statute of exemptions
... is to deny the purpose of the statute." 180 Wis. at 104-5, 104, 192 N.W. at
480. In Madison Particular Council of St. Vincent de Paul Society v. Dane
County, 246 Wis. 208, 16 N.W. 2d 811 (1944), the Court held that the Council
had a "religious" make-up and "benevolent" ends and therefore was exempt.
The Council was affiliated with the St. Vincent de Paul Society, a religious
and charitable association devoted to the care of the poor. The Council oper-
ated a second-hand store which received gifts of clothing, furniture, etc., and
was distributed to the poor. See also, Methodist Episcopal Church Baraca
Club v. City of Madison, 167 Wis. 207, 167 N.W. 258 (1918).260 96 Wis. 636, 72 N.W. 43 (1897).
161 96 Wis. at 640, 72 N.W. at 43-4. "The fact that there were surplus receipts at
times, which were loaned other hospitals of the same character, does not show
that the property was used for pecuniary profit." 96 Wis. at 640, 72 N.W. at 44.162 239 Wis. 278, 1 N.W. 2d 173 (1941).
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support of other hospitals or schools. There were 9 7 %% of the pa-
tients who were incapable of paying. All such charity patients were
sent to the hospital by the state and municipalities which paid for their
care as public charges. "That the public authorities pay for this care,
does not avoid the fact that the patients are objects of charity," said
Judge Fowler for the Supreme Court. 163 It is a "charitable institution,"
therefore, and is exempt.
"The respondents claim is to the effect that the River Pines
Sanatorium should be taxed on the ground that it aims to operate
at a profit. If this be so there is no hospital or school execpt
those municipally operated that is not subject to taxation and the
statute becomes practically or entirely ineffectual. For all benevo-
lent institutions endeavor so to operate. But as the profit made
by these institutions, if any, is payable to nobody, but is only
turned back into improving facilities or extending the benevo-
lence in which the institutions are primarily engaged, the profit
element becomes immaterial. '164
Still another case concerning the Order of the Sisters of St. Joseph,
known as the "Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christ," was United States
National Bank v. The Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christ.1 65 The Catho-
lic order was organized to maintain and teach parochial schools, main-
tain and support hospitals, and to help the poor and distressed. The
question presented was whether St. Joseph's Hospital of Superior was
.a "religious society, association or corporation" within the meaning of
the city charter special assessment provision:
"No lot or parcel of land benefited in said city shall be exempt
from the payment of its portion of any tax or assessment for
sewers, the improvement of streets or the building or repairing
of sidewalks, excepting . . . parsonages or property owned by
163 239 Wis. at 282, 1 N.W. 2d at 175.
264 239 Wis. at 283-4, 1 N.W. 2d at 175. An interesting point here is that public
funds were paid "for the care of patients" to a branch of the Catholic Church.
The Sanatorium gave part of these funds, in excess of costs, to other Catholic
institutions. The question could have been raised, although it is doubtful that
it was raised, whether this was tantamount to the drawing of public funds
from the treasury in support of a particular religion in violation of Wis.
CONsT. Art. I, sec. 18. The issue was not discussed. In 41 Ops. Wis. ATT'Y
GEN. 83 (1952) St. Luke's Hospital of Milwaukee was held not to be a "re-
ligious organization" despite its requirement that there "shall be nineteen
directors of the corporation, all of whom shall be of the protestant faith and
ten of whom shall be Lutheran." According to Attorney General Thomson:
"This may give the controlling voice in the management of the hospital to
persons of the Lutheran faith but it does not subject the hospital to the con-
trol of any organized Lutheran church or organized Lutheran agency." Id. at
84-5. In this connection, distinguish Madison Particular Council of St. Vincent
de Paul Society v. Dane County, 246 Wis. 208, 16 N.W. 2d 811 (1944). For
discussion of the status of church connected orphan homes and asylums, see:
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Shawano County, 256 Wis. 196, 40 N.W. 2d
590 (1949); 40 Ops. Wis. ATr'Y GEN. 419 (1951); 33 Ops. Wis. ATr'y GEN.
254 (1944); 28 Ors. Wis. Arr'y GEN. 154 (1939); and 20 Ops. Wis. An'v
GEN. 685 (1931).165 148 Wis. 613, 135 N.W. 121 (1912).
[Vol. 30
ROPERTY OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
some religious society, association or corporation and not used
for pecuniary profit....
The Supreme Court ruled that "a corporation organized... for benevo-
lent purposes, is not a religious corporation under the Superior char-
ter."166 Said Judge Marshall:
"The suggestion of exemption from taxation under [the state
statute] hardly merits notice, since that has no reference to taxes
on account of special benefits or under police regulations ...
The distinction has been made on the familiar principle that
statutes on the subject of taxation are to be construed, where
construction is permissible, strictly against exemption."' 67
Inheritance and Income Taxes
Wisconsin has also extended to religious institutions the privilege
of exemption from inheritance and income taxes. Exempted from the
inheritance tax is:
"All property transferred to . . . corporations of this state
organized under its laws, solely for religious, humane, charitable
or educational purposes, . . . which shall use the property so
transferred exclusively for the purposes of their organization,
within the state, and all property transferred to banks or trust
companies of this state, or to individuals residing in this state,
as trustees, in trust exclusively for public, religious, humane,
charitable, educational or municipal purposes in this state .... ,,68
According to Attorney General Reynolds, in a 1908 opinion, this
statute does not exempt bequests such as those included in the last will
and testament of Rev. Marius de Wilt:
"Fifth, I give and bequeath to the Rt. Rev. J. J. Fox, bishop
of Green Bay, or his successor in office, the sum of five thousand
dollars.
"Tenth, I give and bequeath to Mother Mary Emily, Prioress
Gen. of the Sisters of St. Dominie at Racine, Wisconsin, or her
successor in office, the sum of five thousand dollars.
"I give and bequeath to the very Rev. Bernard N. Pennings,
Prior to St. Norberts Priory at De Pere, Wisconsin, or his suc-
cessor in office, all the residue of the above said purchase money
and all my estate in America of whatever kind or nature."' 69
These are not bequests to a religious corporation organized under Wis-
consin laws, reasoned the Attorney General. Rather they are bequests
to named individuals or their successors in office, but "no mention is
made as to how the property shall be used."
"While I believe thatia liberal construction should be given to
the above quoted provisibns of the inheritance tax law, in order
166 148 Wis. at 617, 135 N.W. at 122.
167148 Wis. at 617, 135 N.W. at 123.
168 Wis. STAT. sec. 72.04 (1) (1951), created by Wis. Laws ch. 44, sec. 1 (1903).
169 REzr. oF Arr'y GEN. 846, 847 (1908).
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to exempt from its provisions all such bequests as are actually
to be used by corporations in this state for religious.., purposes,
I am unable to see how the law could be so broadly constructed
as to include the above bequests."' 1 0 .
In 1916, on the ground that the statute only exempts corporations of
this state organized for religious purposes, the Attorney General held
that gifts of a deceased resident to religious corporations located outside
the state of Wisconsin are liable to an inheritance tax.17 1
It remains to be noticed that exemption from Wisconsin's income
tax is provided, as follows:
"There shall be exempt from such taxation any part of the
gross income, without limitation, which pursuant to the terms of
the will, deed or other trust instrument creating the trust, is dur-
ing the taxable year permanently set aside to be used exclusively
by or for the state of Wisconsin or any city, village, town, county
or school district therein or any agency of any of them or any
corporation, community chest fund, foundation or association
operating within this state, organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes ..... ,172
Also exempt from the income tax is "income of ... all religious, scien-
tific, educational, benevolent or other corporations or associations of
individuals not organized or conducted for pecuniary profit."'173
CONCLUSION
It appears significant to contemplate here the broader implications
of what has been said. Inviolable separation of Church and State has
been written in very specific terms in the Wisconsin Constitution. But
this has not meant that the state of Wisconsin has been unfriendly to
religious institutions. On the contrary, the state legislature has extended
to them the rights or privileges to exercise corporate powers, to receive
bequests, and to be exempt from taxation. In this sense, the Wisconsin
legislature has emerged as the public benefactor of organized religion.
And the Wisconsin judiciary has emerged as the public protector of
these rights of property. It will inquire into differences of creed to
protect religious property. It will exercise its judicial power to the
fullest extent to enforce religious bequests. And it will give effect to
taxation exemption of religious property as provided.
Perhaps these rights are taken for granted by Wisconsin religious
institutions. They would doubtlessly interpret their repeal as producing
chaos, which well it might. Through the invocation of positive and per-
missive powers of the state, Wisconsin religious property holds a very
preferred position.
170 Id. at 847-8.
'1715 Ops. Wis. AT'y GEN. 101 (1916).
172 WIS. STAT. sec. 71.08 (9) (1951).
173 WIs. STAT. sec. 71.01 (3) (a) (1951).
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